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Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?
Michel/,e Adams*
ABSTRACT: Is integration a form of discrimination? Remarkably, recent
Supreme Court doctrine suggests that the answer to this question may well be
yes. In Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court characterizes-for the very first
time-government action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability and to
integrate the workplace as "race-based, " and then invalidates that action
under a heightened /,evel of judicial review. Consequently, Ricci suggests
that the Court is open to the "equiva/,ence doctrine, " which posits that laws
intended to racially integrate are morally and constitutionally equiva/,ent to
laws intended to racially separate. Under the equiva/,ence doctrine,
integration is simply another form of discrimination. The Court has not yet
fully embraced this view. Ricci contains a significant limiting princip!,e: To
be actionab/,e, the government's action must create racial harm, i.e., sing/,e
out individuals on the basis of their race for some type of adverse treatment.
Thus, the /,esson of Ricci is not that governmental action with an
integrative motive is always prohibited (at /,east for now); instead it is that
racial harm really matters. The chall,enge for the government seeking to
increase integration is to design facially race-neutral programs that open up
access to opportunity and increase integration without imposing racial
harm.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In his concurring opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano, 1 Justice Scalia warned
that the Court's ruling only postponed the "evil day on which the Court will
have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparateimpact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent with
the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection?" 2 Under Title VII's
disparate-impact provisions, both public and private employers may be held
liable for neutral practices that have a disproportionate, adverse impact on a
protected group.3 Ricci did in fact sidestep the question of whether Title
VII's disparate-impact provisions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.4 In his own inimitable fashion, Justice Scalia "teed
up" a question of extraordinary importance: Is liability for disparate impact
unconstitutional? This Article does not address that question directly.5
Instead, this Article addresses an even larger concern: Whether the
government's voluntary attempt to integrate the races, even in the absence of a
racial-classification scheme, is action taken "because of' race and therefore is
presumptively unconstitutional.
In Ricci, seventeen white firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter
challenged the City of New Haven's refusal to certify the results of an
examination to qualify for promotion. 6 If certified, the test results would
have led to no black promotions and only two Hispanic promotions to
supervisory positions within the New Haven Fire Department.7 The City's
action, the refusal to certify the examination results, was facially race-neutral
and hardly motivated by racial animus. Instead, the City was motivated by a
desire to avoid disparate-impact liability-and integrate the workplaceunder Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 Thus, the government's

1. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
2. Id. at 2682 (Scalia,]., concurring).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2 (k) (2006).
4. In Rice~ the petitioners raised both a statutory claim, "under the disparate-treatment
prohibition of Title VII, and a constitutional claim, under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672. The Court ruled that the petitioners were
entitled to summary judgment on the Title VII claim and therefore, did not reach the
constitutional question. Id. at 2681.
5. Other scholars have and will continue to probe this important question. See, e.g.,
Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test
Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73 (2010); Richard A. Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010).
6. Rice~ 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
7. Id. at 2664, 2666, 2678.
8. Id. at 2671. In this Article, I take the position that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was passed at least in part to integrate the workplace. See Richard A. Primus, Equal
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 518-35 (2003) (discussing
three possible reasons for disparate-impact law: disparate impact as an evidentiary dragnet for
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"ultimate aim" in Ricci was to comply with federal law.9 But the government's
action was also race dependent in the sense that its actions likely would have
been "different but for the race of those benefited or disadvantaged by" it. 10
Prior to Ricci, it would have been hard to characterize the governmental
action at issue as a form of discrimination. Controlling precedent in the
parties' circuit held that the "'intent to remedy the disparate impact' of a
promotional exam 'is not equivalent to an intent to discriminate against
non-minority applicants."' 11 And as a matter of constitutional law, the
general rule is that facially race-neutral actions are presumptively
permissible unless the Court infers a "discriminatory purpose." 12 Typically it
is very difficult for plaintiffs to establish discriminatory purpose in
governmental action. 1 3 Indeed, the Court has only found discriminatory
purpose where it can infer racial animus or where it finds that the
government took action "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group." 1 4 Thus, because the government acted
to comply with federal law, one could certainly have understood the City's
refusal to certify the examination results as action taken "in spite of' rather
than "because of' any adverse impact on white candidates. 1 5
Instead, Ricci characterized-for the very first time-action taken to
avoid disparate-impact liability as a form of "race-based" action. The Court
then invalidated that action under a heightened level of judicial review. 16

deliberate discrimination, disparate impact integrates the workplace by ending segregation and
racial hierarchy, and disparate impact remedies subconscious discrimination).
g. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674. The Court conceded that the government's purpose in
refusing to certify the examination results was to avoid disparate-impact liability. Id. ("We
consider, therefore, whether the purpose to avoid disparate-impact liability excuses what
otherwise would be prohibited disparate-treatment discrimination.").
10. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court Term, I975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidi,scrimination Principle, go HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976).
11. Rice~ 129 S. Ct. at 2695-96 (Ginsberg,]., dissenting) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554
F. Supp. 2d 142, 157 (D. Conn. 2006), affd, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd 129 S. Ct. 2658).
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See iryra Part II.B.
14. Pers. Adm'rv. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 (1979).
15. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: G,,\sES AND
MATERIALS 183 (5th ed. Supp. 2009). The authors ask:
Why isn't the employer's decision [in Ricci] "in spite of' the effects on whites?
Perhaps more to the point, since the state action in this case is the federal
government's, why isn't the federal government's purpose the integration of
workforces rather than a desire to harm members of the white majority?
Id.; see also Charles A. Sullivan, Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just Another Turn on the
Di-sparate Impact Road?, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 201, 207 (2009) (arguing that "[a] better
reading of the facts (or at least a plausible one) is that New Haven acted to avoid disparate
impact liability despite the 'adverse effects upon an identifiable group' of whites" (quoting Feeney,
442 U.S. at 279)).
16. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
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Consequently, Ricci finds that action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability
and integrate the workforce is a form of presumptively impermissible racebased action. Ricci thus raises the following question: Is integration itself a
discriminatory purpose? And if integration is a form of "discrimination," can
the government's integrative actions survive strict-scrutiny review?
Ricci was decided on Title VII grounds and purported not to be a
constitutional case. 1 7 But to view Ricci solely from the perspective of Title VII
misses its contribution to the Court's larger conversation about the
definition of "discrimination" fo a variety of contexts. 18 As Cheryl I. Harris
and Kimberly West-Faulcon recently observed, Ricci represents an effort by
some members of the Court to radically redefine the definition of
discrimination so that "thinking about race or racial effects [is] equivalent to
race discrimination." 1 9 Justice Clarence Thomas is perhaps the Court's most
persistent proponent of this "equivalence doctrine." His classic exposition
comes from his concurring opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 20
where he opined: "I believe that there is a 'moral [and] constitutional
equivalence,' between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that
distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current
notion of equality." 21
Over time, the equivalence doctrine has attracted more adherents. In
Parents Involved in Community Schoo{,$ v. Seattle School District No. I, 22 a plurality
of the Court flatly equated race-based student-assignment plans intended to
educate students in a racially integrated environment to state statutes
separating the races in public schools that the Court struck down in Brown v.
Board of Education2 3 as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. And in
Ricci, a majority of the Court ruled that facially neutral governmental action
taken to avoid disparate-impact liability is "race-based," and can only be
justified if the "employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that,
had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparateimpact statute. "2 4 Ricci represents the closest that a majority of the Court has
come to accepting the equivalence doctrine.
Although Parents Involved and Ricci suggest that the Court is
entertaining the equivalence doctrine, the Court has not yet fully embraced
17. Id. at 2672, 2681.
18. See, e.g., 129 S. Ct. 2658; Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct.
2504 (2009); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,551 U.S. 701 (2007).
19. Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, America's Next Race War: How Ricci v.
DeStefano Seeks to Redefine Discrimination, DEFENDERS ONLINE Quly 7, 2009), http:/ /www.the
defendersonline.com/ 2009/07/07 / america' s-next-race-war-how-ricci-v-destefano-seeks-toredefine-discrimination/.
,20. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
21. Id. at 240 (Thomas,]., concurring) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
22. 551 U.S. at 720.
23. 347 U.S. 483 ( 1954).
24. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
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it. The Court in Ricci, after all, left the disparate-impact provisions of Title
VII intact which by its terms does not apply to the Equal Protection Clause.
In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy declined to join those parts of the
plurality opinion that most explicitly embraced the equivalence approach.
Instead, he articulated the view that the government can ameliorate the
harms of de facto segregation and strive toward racial integration, as wng as
it does not create racial harm. "Racial harm" is some type of adverse treatment
that befalls identifiable individuals because of their race. Ricci embraces this
understanding and extends it to facially race-neutral government action.
The central problem in Ricci was that the government refused to certify the
examination results only after it learned that "white candidates had
outperformed minority candidates." 2 5 From this perspective, the
government created racial harm when it divested specific, identifiable
individuals of a "vested right" to their promotions.
Thus, the Court is at a crossroads. A plurality of the Court would accept
the equivalence doctrine in its entirety. Another wing of the Court solidly
rejects this approach. Justice Breyer's dissent in Parents Involved exemplifies
this wing of the Court by stressing "the legal and practical difference
between the use of race-conscious criteria ... to keep the races apart, and
the use of race-conscious criteria to ... bring the races together." 26 Justice
Kennedy straddles the line between the two approaches. He acknowledges
that the government may pursue racial diversity and attempt to ameliorate
de facto segregation. But Justice Kennedy requires that the costs of
obtaining integration must be as diffused as possible: Specific white
individuals must not be able to trace the source of their grievances directly
to governmental action intended to achieve integration.
Certainly, this conversation will continue on both a normative and
doctrinal level. On the normative question-should integration be defined
as a form of discrimination-both wings of the Court will continue to
compete for Justice Kennedy's affection. On the doctrinal side, Ricci
provides the blueprint for the Court to find that the government's facially
race-neutral integrative action, which creates racial harm, is presumptively
unconstitutional. Whether the Court will ultimately strike down such
government action as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause depends to
a large extent on the outcome of the normative debate. If integration equals
discrimination then it is hard to imagine how the government justifies
integrative action on strict-scrutiny review. Ricci does not mean that all
facially race-neutral integrative action is presumptively unconstitutional. As I
discuss below, facially race-neutral, yet integrative initiatives, such as the
National Opportunity Voucher Program, that do not create racial harm

25.
26.

Id. at 2664.
551 U.S. at 829 (Breyer,]., dissenting).
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stand an excellent chance of passing constitutional muster even when the
"llicci effect" is factored into the constitutional calculus.
In Part II of this Article, I explore how the Court has traditionally
viewed race-dependent government action. The Court generally strikes
down racial-classification schemes under the Equal Protection Clause.
Traditionally, however, the government enjoys immunity from equalprotection liability when it takes facially race-neutral action that is not
motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Thus, the government's ability to
take facially race-neutral, yet integrative, action turns on whether the action
is motivated by what the Court perceives as a discriminatory purpose.
In Part III of this Article, I explore Parents Involved and Ricci in-depth. I
explain how the plurality in Parents Involved defined "discrimination" to
include both acts that further white supremacy as well as acts that attempt to
ameliorate de facto segregation. Thus, the Parents Involved plurality signaled
its openness to the argument that facially race-neutral action, even when
taken to produce integration, is "race related" and thus impermissible. I
next explain how Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved, in
contrast to the plurality, would allow the government to take facially neutral,
yet race-conscious, actions aimed at increasing racial diversity and
ameliorating de facto segregation. At the same time, Justice Kennedy
expressed deep concern about governmental action-whatever its sourcethat creates racial harm.
I conclude Part III by explaining how the Court in Ricci imported a
plaintiff-friendly, reverse-discrimination doctrine of equal protection into
the Title VII context. I argue that while Ricci raises the question of whether
the government is prohibited from taking facially race-neutral action that is
motivated by integrative intent, its holding (thankfully) is more limited. Ricci
suggests that since the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII intended to
promote workplace integration, facially neutral actions taken to achieve
integration are race-based and presumptively impermissible if and only if such
action creates racial harm. Moving forward, the government's challenge is to
design effective, facially race-neutral programs that do not entrench the
status quo, open up access to opportunity, provide for maximum racial
integration, and do not create racial harm.
In Part IV of this Article, I explain how the Court's recent embrace of
the equivalence approach underestimates integration's importance as a
lever for achieving social change and is out of step with previous doctrine.
For instance, in Grutter v. Bollinger, 2 7 the Court views racial segregation as a
particularly and perhaps uniquely harmful social arrangement. Grutter
suggests that racial integration is an important social good and that the
government can act to disestablish segregation. Moreover, the Court has
consistently ruled that race-neutral means may validate otherwise

27.

539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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impermissible race-conscious affirmative action plans. This earlier
jurisprudence implies that facially race-neutral, yet racially motivated,
governmental actions are constitutional. Consequently, other recent
Supreme Court caselaw stands in stark contrast to Parents Involved and Ricci.
Finally, in Part V of this Article, I show how the Court's recent approach
may have broader implications across the country. Last year, the Poverty and
Race Research Action Council proposed that the federal government adopt
the National Opportunity Voucher Program ("NOVP"), a large, integrative
housing-mobility program. The purpose of the NOVP is to allow current
federal housing-voucher holders living in economically and racially
segregated neighborhoods to move to more racially integrated, higherincome areas. Under the NOVP, a percentage of the total housing-voucher
pool would be available only to families living in highly racially segregated
and high-poverty neighborhoods; families receiving such vouchers would be
provided with counseling and other assistance to facilitate integrative moves.
Thus, the NOVP is facially race-neutral but is clearly intended to create
integrated housing opportunities.
Ricci measures "racial harm" in terms of direct impact on specific,
identifiable white individuals with vested rights; the NOVP does not occasion
such harm. So even assuming that a court applied strict-scrutiny review to
the NOVP, it is highly unlikely that the Equal Protection Clause would
invalidate the program. However, one of the most troubling aspects of _Ricci
is that it raises the possibility that the NOVP is constitutionally problematic,
causing government actors to second-guess policy decisions that should be
"no brainers." After Ricci, one can imagine white plaintiffs seeking to prevent
NOVP voucher holders from entering their neighborhoods by asserting that
the NOVP is "race-based" and therefore constitutionally suspect. And if the
Court ultimately decides that integration equals discrimination, such an
argument would likely succeed. The Court has not yet fully embraced the
equivalence doctrine, but the constitutional conversation in this area is far
from finished.

II.

SOLVING FOR SEGREGATION: RACE-DEPENDENT GOVERNMENT ACTION

A.

THE RACIAL-CLASSIF1CATION TRACK

The constitutionality of race-dependent government action proceeds
along two primary tracks. Track one is the "racial classification" approach.
Because the Court infers intentional discrimination from racial
classifications, 28 the ultimate constitutionality of race-dependent

28. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 23g-40 (1976), conclusively established that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits only intentional discrimination. See also David A. Strauss,
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 937 (1989) (stating that
Washington v. Davis stands for the proposition that discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause means "acting with discriminatory intent").
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government action turns on the strength of the government's justification
for the classification. 2 9 The Court's method for gauging the government's
justification for a racial classification is known as "strict-scrutiny review."
Strict scrutiny requires that the government show a compelling justification
for racial classification and that the means chosen to achieve that
justification are "narrowly tailored" to effect its purpose.3° Otherwise, the
Court would invalidate the classification under the Equal Protection Clause.
Perhaps because the harms associated with segregation are so great, the
Court particularly disfavors racial classifications that segregate. Thus, the
Court will review under strict scrutiny any express racial classifications such
as a racial quota, a race-based set-aside or presumption, or a multivariate
selection process which uses race as a factor.
Under strict scrutiny, all racial classifications, whether benign or
invidious, are presumptively unconstitutional.31 There are, of course,
different interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause that suggest that the
Court should subject racial classifications that benefit racial minorities to a
more deferential standard of judicial review.3 2 But this debate is now largely
academic. The Court has consistently rejected those arguments in favor of a
symmetrical approach: All racial classifications are subject to strict-scrutiny
review.33
The Court's real debate is on how to apply strict-scrutiny review.34 A
recent example is Johnson v. California.35 There, the issue was whether the
California Department of Correction's ("CDC") unwritten policy of racially
segregating all new male inmates in double cells upon arrival at a new
29. Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86
GEO. LJ. 279, 290 (1997).
30. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995).
31. Id. at 222-23, 226-27, 234.
32. See, e.g., id. at 243-49 (Stevens,]., dissenting); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,
564-65 (1990), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
33. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720
(2007) (indicating tliat all nine justices agreed tliat tlie standard to be applied to tlie racialclassification schemes at issue was strict scrutiny).
34. Compare id. at 725-33 (see infra Part III.B), and id. at 735-48 (see infra Part V), with id.
at 748-82 (Thomas, J., concurring in tlie judgment) (agreeing witli the majority and arguing
tliat strict scrutiny is required even for benign classifications because even tliose "suffer[] tlie
same constitutional infirmity as invidious race-based decisionmaking"), id. at 782-98 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in tlie judgment) (affirming strict-scrutiny analysis for racial classifications, but
emphasizing tliat tlie government can pass tliis standard by proving tliat tlie classification is
sufficiently narrowly tailored), id. at 798-803 (Stevens,]., dissenting) (arguing tliat tlie majority
failed to see tlie significance of tlie difference between tlie racial classifications in this case that
"do not impose burdens on one race alone and do not stigmatize or exclude" and oilier forms
of classifications tliat do), and id. at 803-68 (Breyer,]., dissenting) (asserting tliat the context of
tlie classification matters and strict scrutiny tliat is "fatal in fact" when applied should only be
tlie standard for classifications tliat harmfully exclude, and additionally tliat tliis case requires a
more lenient standard tlian traditional strict scrutiny).
35· 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
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correctional facility violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 6 The CDC's rationale for segregating prisoners by race was to
prevent racial gang violence.37 Under the CDC policy, racially segregated
housing assignments were automatic; there was no individualized assessment
of the prisoner's propensity to engage in violence and the CDC never
"experimented with, or even carefully considered, race-neutral methods of
achieving its goals."3 8 Because the CDC's policy embodied a racial
classification, the Court ruled that strict-scrutiny review should apply.39
However, the Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the CDC policy.
Instead, it remanded the case to the lower federal court and indicated that
the unique circumstances of the prison context should guide that court in
applying strict scrutiny.4° The Court's context-specific characterization of
strict scrutiny suggested that the outcome on remand was not entirely
certain.4'
But as Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, remanding the case to the
lower court to apply strict scrutiny was unnecessary; there was insufficient
evidence to support the asserted link between integrated housing
assignments and violence.4 2 The CDC's position was that "if race were not
36. Id. at 502-03. Under the CDC's policy, all male inmates were initially housed with
inmates of the same race in reception centers for up to sixty days after their arrival so that
prison officials could make final placement determinations for each inmate. Id. at 502.
37. Id. at 502.
38. Id. at 521 (Stevens,]., dissenting).
39. Id. at512-13 (majority opinion).
40. Id. at 515.
41. Id. ("Prisons are dangerous places, and the special circumstances they present may
justify racial classifications in some contexts. Such circumstances can be considered in applying
strict scrutiny, which is designed to take relevant differences into account."). On remand, the
case settled, and the defendants agreed to "end segregation of inmates by race in its facilities"
rather than "attempt to make a showing that the policy would survive strict scrutiny." Johnson v.
California, No. CV 95-1192 CBM, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2006) (on file with the Iowa
Law Review) ("Order Finding Entitlement to Attorney's Fees"); Settlement and Release
Agreement, Johnson v. California, (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2005), availabl,e at http://www.
clearinghouse.net/ chDocs/public/PC-CA-0041-0001. pdf.
42. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 517-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens assessed the
purported link between interracial housing assignments and gang violence in the following
manner:
[T] he CDC's post hoc, generalized evidence of gang violence is only tenuously
related to its segregation policy. Significantly, the CDC has not cited a single
specific incident of interracial violence between cellmates--much less a pattern of
such violence--that prompted the adoption of its unique policy years ago. Nor is
there any indication that antagonism between cellmates played any role in the
more recent riots the CDC mentions. And despite the CDC's focus on prison gangs
and its suggestion that such gangs will recruit new inmates into committing racial
violence during their 60-day stays in the reception centers, the CDC has cited no
evidence of such recruitment, nor has it identified any instances in which new
inmates committed racial violence against other new inmates in the common areas,
such as the yard or the cafeteria.
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considered in making initial housing assignments ... there would be racial
conflict in the cells and in the yard."43 The CDC's policy automatically
equated interracial contact with racial violence without any individualized
determination to establish such a relationship in any particular inmate's
case.44 Under the policy, "an inmate's race is a proxy for gang membership,
and gang membership is a proxy for violence."45 For Justice Stevens, the
CDC's racial-segregation policy amounted to a classic invidious racial
classification because of its supposition that race alone is predictive of
violence. Thus, there was no need to remand the case because on "the
record before [the Court], ... the CDC's policy [was] unconstitutional."46
With the important exception of the University of Michigan Law School
admissions scheme upheld in Grutter, the Supreme Court has invalidated
every single racial-classification scheme that benefited a racial minority (and
that did not intend to remedy the effects of past discrimination by
employing the classification scheme).47 Racial classifications are
presumptively unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, even
when intended to benefit members of groups formerly discriminated
against, because such classifications deny individuals their '"personal rights'
to be treated with equal dignity and respect,"48 they risk stigmatic harm,49
and because they may "promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a
politics of racial hostility."5° Thus, it is very difficult for the government to
solve for racial segregation using explicit racial preferences.

Id. at 520.
43. Id. at 503 (majority opinion).
44. Id. at 517 (Stevens,]., dissenting).

45· Id.
46. Id. at 523.
47. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007);
Gratzv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shawv. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. goo (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
48. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
49· Id.
50. Id. In his concurring opinion in Croson, Justice Scalia expounded on the harms of
racial classifications:
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as nothing
compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the source of those
effects, which is the tendency-fatal to a Nation such as ours-to classify and judge
men and women on the basis of their country of origin or the color of their skin. A
solution to the first problem that aggravates the second is no solution at all.
Id. at 520-21 (Scalia,]., concurring in the judgment). From Justice Scalia's perspective, racial
classifications require the government to "know" a citizen's race, to take account of her racial
identity, and for race to matter with respect to allocating benefits and burdens. Id.
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THE FACIAILY RACE-NEUTRAL TRACK

Alternatively, the government might take facially race-neutral action
with the purpose of ameliorating the harms associated with segregation. The
Court has taken a very different view of facially race-neutral rules,
regulations, statutes, or other government action that disproportionately
impact members of a racial group. While racial-classification schemes are
generally struck down (intentional discrimination is the sine qua non of an
equal-protection violation), facially race-neutral government action is
generally upheld (racially disproportionate impact is simply the byproduct
of otherwise valid governmental action and thus is constitutionally benign).
These defaults correlate with adjudicative presumptions: facially neutral
rule: advantage government; racial classification: advantage plaintiff.5'
Under the facially race-neutral track, laws or other government action
with a disproportionate racial impact do not offend the Equal Protection
Clause unless that law or rule "reflects a racially discriminatory purpose."5 2
One argument is that the Court, as a normative matter, should interpret the
Equal Protection Clause to bring the government's lack of consideration for

51. For instance, proof of discriminatory purpose does not result in the automatic
invalidation of the facially neutral rule. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252,271 n.21 (1977). If the defendant can show that it would have taken the
complained-of action even in the absence of discriminatory purpose, there is no equalprotection violation. Id. Moreover, it is quite difficult for a plaintiff to demonstrate that a
facially race-neutral rule is animated by a discriminatory purpose. Selmi, supra note 29, at 33435 (arguing that the Court only infers discriminatory purpose in two situations: "when the
factual circumstances 'bespeak discrimination' and no other plausible explanation presents
itself' and "when the evidence indicates that the legislation results in the total, or near total,
exclusion of African-Americans"); see a!,so McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987)
(demonstrating that a defendant challenging a death sentence because of its racially
discriminatory application cannot simply rely on statistical disparity but must prove that "the
decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose"). Typically such a showing will be
made via circumstantial rather than direct evidence, and the Court will not infer discriminatory
purpose lightly. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68 (in the "rare" case, "a clear pattern [of
discrimination], unexplainable on grounds other than race," could prove discriminatory
purpose). The Court states:
The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source .... The
specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision also may shed
some light on the decisionmaker's purposes. . . . Departures from the normal
procedural sequence also might afford evidence that improper purposes are
playing a role. Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if the
factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision
contrary to the one reached.
The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where
there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body,
minutes of its meetings, or reports.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
52. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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racially disproportionate impact within its purview.53 But the Court has
consistently reaffirmed its holding in Washington v. Davis. Only intentional
discrimination, rather than racially disproportionate impact, violates the
Equal Protection Clause.54 Absent a discriminatory purpose, facially neutral
rules are subject to the rational basis test, the most deferential form of
judicial review, and are almost always upheld.55
The Court does not require a finding of animus or hostility toward
members of a protected group in order to establish a discriminatory
purpose.56 As the Court observed in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, in
evaluating a facially gender-neutral statute, discriminatory purpose implies
that the "decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group."57 Leading cases, such as Rogers v. Lodge5 8 and
Hunter v. Underwood,59 suggest that the Court will infer discriminatory
purpose only where race is essentially the "but-for" motivation for the facially
neutral action. 60 As Michael Selmi explained, "[T]he Court has only seen
discrimination, absent a facial classification, in the most overt or obvious
situations-situations that could not be explained on any basis other than

53. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 345-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (Stevens,]., concurring); id. at 281-88 (Marshall,]., dissenting); cf.
Davis, 426 U.S. at 253-54 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that no bright-line distinction
exists between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact).
54. 426 U.S. at 229; see, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986); Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,617 (1982); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-65.
55. See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66.
56. Selmi, supra note 29, at 292 ("The petitioner need not prove that the decisionmaker
acted with any animus or illicit motive.").
57. 442 U.S. at 279.
58. 458 U.S. at 627 (ruling that in Burke County, Georgia, where blacks made up a
majority of the population and whites a slight majority of the voting age population, at-large
method of elections for County Board of Commissioners-which had never had a black
member-were maintained for racially invidious purposes).
59. 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (ruling that the provision of the Alabama Constitution that
disenfranchised anyone convicted of a crime "involving moral turpitude," which was claimed to
include the crime of presenting a worthless check, violated the Equal Protection Clause).
60. Id. at 233. The Court stated:
Without deciding whether [the challenged provision] would be valid if enacted
today without any impermissible motivation, we simply observe that its original
enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of
race and the section continues to this day to have that effect. As such, it violates
equal protection under Arlington Heights.
Id.; see also Rogers, 458 U.S. at 622-27 (outlining extensive evidence considered and relied upon
by the district court in reaching the conclusion that discrimination was intentional and
declining to pronounce these factual findings as clearly erroneous).
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race. Whenever the Court found room to accept a nondiscriminatory
explanation for a disputed act, it did so." 61
Thus, it is hard to overstate the significance of a finding of
discriminatory purpose for ultimately denying the constitutionality of
government action. Facially race-neutral government action is immunized
from constitutional attack unless the Court can draw an inference of
discriminatory purpose. Thus, the government may use facially race-neutral
means to "solve for segregation" if those means are not motivated by a
discriminatory purpose. But an unrebutted finding of discriminatory
purpose converts a facially neutral rule into a racial classification, creating
an overwhelming presumption of unconstitutionality. 62

Ill. WHEN PARENTS INVOLVED MET RICCI
If the constitutional prerogative for government action is "racial
neutrality," 6 3 then one might argue that any action taken by the government
to eradicate racial segregation is race-based. One argument is that, if the
government takes affirmative steps to eradicate de facto segregation, then it
is no longer "neutral" when it comes to race, regardless of whether those
actions are facially race-neutral or are embodied in racial-classification
schemes. Thus, one could argue that facially race-neutral action, even when
taken to produce integration, is "race related" and thus impermissible. From
this perspective, if a government's facially race-neutral but integrative action
is synonymous with "race," that action is motivated by a discriminatory
purpose and is presumptively impermissible. Even before Ricci, a plurality of
the Court in Parents Involved signaled its agreement with this approach. 64

61. Selmi, supra note 29, at 284; see also Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and
Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 47-48 (1977) ("Even
when the Court is willing to explore official motive, the problems of proof often will be
insurmountable for the plaintiff.").
62. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976); cf. Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977) (showing no further inquiry where
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to establish a prima fade case of discriminatory purpose).
63. See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
LJ. 1205, 1255 (1970). Ely explained:
A number of commentators have asserted that government officials may, if they
wish, go out of their way to favor the members of minority races without violating
the Constitution. But none of whom I am aware, and certainly not the Court, has
argued that such favoritism is constitutionally required: the Fourteenth
Amendment is read only to require "neutrality" toward such groups.
Id. (footnote omitted).
64. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735-48

(2007) (plurality opinion) (Part IV of Justice Roberts's opinion, joined by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito).
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A.

THEPARENTS INVOLVED PLURALITY ANDRACENEUTRAllTY

Parents Involved marked the first time the Court applied its affirmativeaction jurisprudence to the K-1 2 public-school context. Parents Involved was
a mixed plurality/majority opinion. Writing for a majority of the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts held that two public-school districts' voluntary racebased student-assignment plans violated the Equal Protection Clause
because the plans were insufficiently narrowly tailored. 6 5 Essentially, the
Court viewed the student-assignment plans as an impermissible form of
affirmative action, even though there was no "merits" determination and no
student possessed a vested right to attend any particular public school. 66
The four:iustice Parents Involved plurality cast significant doubt on the
constitutionality of the purpose of the school districts' race-based studentassignment plans. The two school districts attempted to justify the race-based
student-assignment plans as efforts to reduce racial concentration in the
schools and/ or to educate students in a "racially integrated environment."67
Thus, at least one justification for those plans was integration. 68
The entire tenor of the plurality's opinion is skepticism, both of the
school districts' motivations and of the asserted integrative goal itself. The
plurality interpreted the Brown decision as requiring perfect governmental
neutrality when it comes to race. For the plurality, Brown did not allow any
racial "discrimination"-whether that discrimination furthered white
supremacy or attempted to ameliorate de facto segregation. 69 The
government must be neutral when it comes to race, and efforts to promote
racial integration are necessarily suspect. Indeed, the plurality converted the
school districts' integration justification into the desire to obtain racial
balance: "In design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance,
pure and simpl,e, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as
illegitimate."7° From the plurality's perspective, the school districts' actual
goal was patent racial balancing, rather than a good-faith attempt to achieve
the benefits associated with integration or to "ensure that racially
concentrated housing patterns do not prevent nonwhite students from
having access to the most desirable schools."7 1
Integration and ameliorating the effects of de facto segregation are
entirely distinct from "racial balancing." Integration, particularly in its most

65. Id. at 733-35.
66. Id. at 855 (Breyer,]., dissenting).
67. Id. at 725 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. After the Court ruled that the school districts' voluntary student-assignment plans
could not be supported as a remedy for past intentional discrimination or on a Grutter-style
diversity theory, id. at 720-25 (majority opinion), the plurality then addressed the propriety of
integration as a compelling interest, id. at 725-33 (plurality opinion).
69. Id. at 746-48 (plurality opinion).
70. Id. at 726 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at725.
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robust or "radical" sense, has both an associational element and an
instrumental, or material element.7 2 True integration creates association
where there had been separation, but under conditions of mutuality, and
material and social equality. 73 Conversely, "racial balancing" is an effort "to
assure ... some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of
its race or ethnic origin."74 Racial balancing is attention to racial statistics
wholly divorced from any positive aim to facilitate minority empowerment or
capture any prospective, society-wide benefits of integration articulated by
Justice O'Connor in Grutter.75 Racial balancing is aesthetics.7 6
The plurality's conversion of the two school districts' integration
justification into acts of racial balancing raises several concerns. First, the
plurality's conflation of racial diversity or integration with racial balancing
undermines the compelling interest the Court recognized in the context of
Grutter, casting doubt on the propriety of integration.77 Although achieving
racial balance cannot justify the use of racial classifications, the Court has
recognized in at least one context that "obtaining the educational benefits
that flow from a diverse student body" is a compelling interest which justifies
the use of racial classifications.78 Moreover, as Justice Breyer noted in his
Parents Involved dissent, the Court's holdings in school-desegregation cases
certainly permit "local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve
positive race-related goals."79 But the plurality casts doubt on those holdings
too, suggesting that school boards' desegregative actions are illegitimate
forms of racial balancing.

72. Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 272-73 (2006).
73. Id. at 272-76.
74. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,329 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. See id. at 330-33. The Court, in recounting the law school's claim of a compelling
argument, stated:
[N]umerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes,
and "better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society,
and better prepares them as professionals." ... [M]ajor American businesses have
made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can
only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints.... Moreover, universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the
training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders. . . . In order to
cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary
that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of
every race and ethnicity.

Id. (citations omitted); see a/,so id. at 330 (indicating that the District Court found a diverse
student body "promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' helps to break down racial stereotypes,
and 'enables [students] to better understand persons of different races"' (alteration in
original)).
76. Id. at 354 n.3, 355 (Thomas,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. See i?ifra Part IV.B.
78. Orutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
79• 551 U.S. 701,823 (2007) (Breyer,]., dissenting).
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More globally, the plurality's approach can be seen as an attempt to
"rebrand" integration. 8° Conflating integration with racial balance
downgrades its status as a societal ideal and sows definitional confusion,
which discourages government actors from attempting to integrate at all. 81
Finally, the plurality's approach lends credence to the idea that integration
itself may be a discriminatory purpose. After all, if integration is synonymous
with "racial balance," and racial balance is "an objective th[e] Court has
repeatedly condemned as illegitimate," 82 then perhaps integration is too.
The Parents Involved plurality raises profound doubts that integration is an
objective the government should pursue. It is a significant step toward
destabilizing the concept of "discrimination."
B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE

Justice Kennedy provided the pivotal fifth vote in Parents Involved,
mitigating (somewhat) the decision's impact. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Kennedy took issue with parts of the plurality's compellinggovemmental-interest analysis. 8 3 On Justice Kennedy's view, school "districts
can seek to reach Brown's objective of equal educational opportunity." 84
More specifically, Justice Kennedy asserted that school districts have a
compelling interest in attempting to ameliorate de facto segregation and in
achieving a diverse student population. 8 5
The puzzle of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion was his definition
of "race consciousness":
[R]ace-conscious measures ... address the problem [of a nondiverse student-body composition interfering with the objective of
an equal educational opportunity] in a general way [whereas racial
classifications] treat[] each student in different fashion solely on
the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race .... [Permissible]
mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different
treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she
is to be defined by race.... These [mechanisms] include
So. For instance, in his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas says explicitly, "[O]utside of
the context of remediation for past de jure segregation, 'integration' is simply racial balancing."
Id. at 750 n.2 (Thomas,]., concurring).
81. john a. powell, Exec. Dir., Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, Solving the
Integration Problem: From Confusion to Public Support, Address at The Harvard Law School
Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race & Justice National Summit on Interdistrict
Desegregation, Passing the Torch: The Past, Present, and Future of Interdistrict School
Desegregation (Jan. 17, 2009). The PowerPoint presentation accompanying Professor powell's
address is available at http:/ /www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/ assets/ documents/ events/
Passing%2othe%20Torch/powell_From%20Confusion%2oto%20Support2.pdf.
82. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 726.
83. Id. at 787-go (Kennedy,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
84. Id. at 788.
85. Id.at788-89.
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[specified] facially race-neutral means ... or, if necessary, a more
nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student
characteristics that might include race as a component. The latter
approach would be informed by Grutter, though of course the
criteria relevant to student placement would differ based on the
age of the students, the needs of the parents, and the role of the
schools. 86
Race consciousness does not mean racial classifications. The governmental
means obviously matter to Justice Kennedy. Racial classifications that single
out individuals for race-based treatment amount to per se violations of the
Equal Protection Clause. 87 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that race may be
"taken into account" by the government. 88 Perhaps taking race into account
means that the government may have an awareness of race, in the same way
it is aware of the racial makeup of the citizenry when it draws electoral
district lines. 89 But Justice Kennedy seems to mean something more than
simply a school district's action taken against a background "awareness" of
the racial makeup of the district or neighborhood. Instead, by "race
conscious" he seems to mean that the government may pursue raceconscious ends. And by race conscious ends, he means the objective of
obtaining racial diversity in the school system and/ or ameliorating the
effects of de facto segregation. Thus, from Justice Kennedy's view, school
authorities may "consider the racial makeup of schools and . . . adopt
general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is
its racial composition.''9° On this view, "race" or "race consciousness"
equates positively with integration.
For Justice Kennedy, the government may seek to achieve integration
but may not pursue the integration objective using racial classifications.
What is .particularly notable about Justice Kennedy's approach is that the
government may pursue the race-conscious objective of integration without
even triggering strict-scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, the following key passage:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students
of diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including
strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones
with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods;
86. Id. at 788-go.
87. Id. at 793-98. "What the government is not permitted to do, absent a showing of
necessity not made here, is to classify every student on the basis of race and to assign each of
them to schools based on that classification." Id. at 798.
88. Id. at 787.
89. SeeMillerv.Johnson, 515 U.S. goo, 916 (1995); Shawv. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,641,644
( 1 993).
go. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
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allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and
faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments,
performance, and other statistics by race. These mechanisms are
race conscious but do not /,ead to different treatment based on a
classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by
race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to
be found permissible.9 1
This passage suggests that the essence of the equal-protection violation
is not government action taken with an awareness of race, but government
action that harms white individuals, i.e., racial harm. From this perspective,
the form of the governmental action matters because the more explicit the
race-conscious action, the more likely such action will harm identifiable
white individuals.Justice Kennedy is concerned that the government's use of
racial classifications tends to essentialize and therefore debase the
individual. According to Justice Kennedy, the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits the government from using racial-classification schemes because
they define individuals who are necessarily complex, multifaceted, and
unique, by virtue of a narrow racial category.9 2 The Equal Protection Clause
intended to prevent racial harm, which is typified by, but not limited to,
racial-classification schemes: "What the government is not permitted to do,
absent a showing of necessity not made here, is to classify every student on
the basis of race and to assign each of them to schools based on that
classification."93 Under this reasoning, where government attempts to
ameliorate the harms associated with segregation through race-neutral
means, the prospects of racial harm are diminished.
Like the plurality, Justice Kennedy shares the view that the Equal
Protection Clause generally requires governmental neutrality towards race;
he differs in that he would allow deviations from this baseline only where
white individuals are harmed in a less overt, more diffuse manner. Justice
Kennedy believes governmental action raises significant equal-protection
concerns-i.e., triggers "strict scrutiny"-when the government classifies
citizens on the basis of their race thereby defining them based on their
racial characteristics. Moreover, where the government uses racialclassification schemes, race is at the forefront rather than in the background
of government decision-making. Therefore, racial classifications are clearly
in tension with any constitutional requirement of racial neutrality.

91. Id. at 789 (emphasis added).
92. Id. ("Assigning to each student a personal designation according to a crude system of
individual racial classifications is quite a different matter; and the legal analysis changes
accordingly.").
93. Id. at 798.
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RICCI V. DESTEFANO

In Ricci, the Supreme Court ruled that the City of New Haven violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it refused to certify the results
of examinations for promotion to the rank of lieutenant and captain in the
New Haven Fire Department.94 In 2003, 118 New Haven firefighters took a
written examination to qualify for "promotion to the rank of lieutenant or
captain."95 These 118 firefighters were competing for fifteen promotions
within the New Haven Fire Department; eight lieutenant positions and seven
captain positions were vacant at the time of the examination.96 A candidate's
performance on the written exam was the most important factor
determining eligibility for promotion.97 The City filled promotion vacancies
based on the "rule of three," which required the City to fill each promotion
vacancy from the top three scorers on the examination.98
The pass rate on the examination for minority candidates was
approximately one-half the pass rate for white candidates.99 If the City had
certified the examination results, all of the vacant lieutenant positions would
have gone to white candidates; seven white applicants and two Hispanic
applicants would have filled the captain positions. 100 Thus, no AfricanAmerican candidates would have been promoted. 101 Because the City
refused to certify the examination results, "no one was promoted, and
firefighters of every race will have to participate in another selection process
to be considered for promotion." 102
94. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2666. The breakdown of the candidates sitting for the promotion examination
and their examination results by race is as follows:
Seventy-seven candidates completed the lieutenant examination-43 whites, 19
blacks, and 15 Hispanics. Of those, 34 candidates passed-2 5 whites, 6 blacks, and
3 Hispanics .... Forty-one candidates completed the captain examination-25
whites, 8 blacks, and 8 Hispanics. Of those, 22 candidates passed-16 whites, 3
blacks, and 3 Hispanics.
Id. (citation omitted).
97. Under the City's contract with the New Haven firefighters union, "applicants for
lieutenant and captain positions were to be screened using written and oral examinations, with
the written exam accounting for 60 percent and the oral exam 40 percent of an applicant's
total score." Id. at 2665.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2678. On the lieutenant exam, "the pass rate for white candidates was 58.1
percent; for black candidates, 31.6 percent; and for Hispanic candidates, 20 percent." Id. On
the captain exam, "the pass rate for white candidates was 64 percent but was 37.5 percent for
both black and Hispanic candidates." Id. at 2677-78.
100. Id. at 2666.
101. Id. at 2678.
102. Id. at 2696 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d
142, 158 (D. Conn. 2006), affd, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), reu'd 129 S. Ct. 2658) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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White firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter who were likely
candidates for promotion based on the discarded examination results sued
the City, asserting that its failure to certify the examination results
discriminated against them on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 103 The plaintiffs' statutory assertions turned on Title VII's
"disparate treatment" prov1S1on, which prohibits employers from
intentionally discriminating against employees on the basis of race and other
protected categories. 104 Under Title VII, a disparate-treatment plaintiff must
show '"that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive' for taking a
job-related action." 105 Conversely, the City's statutory defense turned on
another provision of Title VII: The City asserted that it had a "good-faith
belief that [it] would have violated the disparate-impact prohibition in Title
VII had [it] certified the examination results." 106
A prima fade violation of Title VII's disparate-impact provisions is
established when an employer's neutral employment practice,. such as a
written examination, has a disproportionate adverse impact on a member of
a group protected under the statute. 107 The employer may defend the Title
VII disparate-impact suit only by showing that the neutral employment
practice is ''.job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity." 108 And, even if the neutral employment practice is jobrelated and necessary, a disparate-impact plaintiff might still succeed by
showing "that the employer refuses to adopt an available alternative
employment practice that has less disparate impact and serves the
employer's legitimate needs." 109 The City's position vis-a-vis the plaintiffs'
disparate-treatment assertion under Title VII was that if it had certified the
examination results, it would have violated Title VII's prohibition against
employment actions that have a disproportionately adverse impact on
minority group members. With respect to plaintiffs' Title VII claim, the City
presented a classic "between a rock and a hard place" defense.
The Court ruled that, "before an employer can engage in intentional
discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an
unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in

103.
104.

Id. at 2664, 2671 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2671; see 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a) (1) (2006) (making it unlawful for an employer
to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
105. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672 (quoting Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
986(1988)).
106. Id. at 2671 (citation omitted).
107. See42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
108. Rice~ 129 S. Ct. at 2673 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id.
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evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to
take the race conscious, discriminatory action." 110 The Court conceded that
the City had a good-faith basis for believing that it would have violated the
disparate-impact provisions of Title VII if it had certified the examination
results. Indeed, the Court ruled that the City, in rationalizing why it did not
certify the examination results, had made out a prima fade case of disparateimpact liability, against itself.'" However, the City did not meet the new
"strong basis in evidence" standard because the City might not have been
found liable under a disparate-impact theory if it had certified the
examination results. The Court opined: "[T] here is no evidence-let alone
the required strong basis in evidence-that the tests were flawed because
they were not job-related or because other, equally valid and less
discriminatory tests were available to the City."" 2 Thus, for the Court, there
was no need to reach the plaintiffs' equal-protection allegations.' '3
Ricci raises the question of whether the government's desire to integrate
the workplace is itself a discriminatory purpose and is therefore
prohibited."4 The City of New Haven's actions were race-dependent in that
those actions likely "would have been different but for the race of those
benefited or disadvantaged by them.""5 But the City's ultimate aim in
taking such race-dependent action was to comply with the disparate-impact
provisions of Title VII, which were passed at least in part to integrate the
workplace. If the City had certified the examination results, a prima fade
case of disparate-impact liability would have been stated against it. " 6
Moreover, the City's actions were also facially race-neutral. As Justice
Ginsburg noted in dissent:

[The City's actions] were race-neutral in this sense: "[A]ll the test
results were discarded, no one was promoted, and firefighters of
every race will have to participate in another selection process to be
considered for promotion." New Haven's action, which gave no
individual a preference, "was 'simply not analogous to a quota
system or a minority set-aside where candidates, on the basis of
their race, are not treated uniformly."'"7
The question, then, is whether the City's facially race-neutral, yet racedependent action amounted to discrimination.

11 o.
111.
112.
113.

u4.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 2677 ( emphasis added).
Id. at 2677-78.
Id. at 2681.
Id.
See infra Part III.C.
Brest, supra note 1o, at 6.
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678.
Id. at 2696 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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Thus, my focus here is on Ricci's implications for facially race-neutral
governmental actions motivated by a desire for general integration. This
inquiry nec~ssarily raises equal-protection concerns. Indeed, there are real
reasons to be skeptical about the Court's attempt to cabin Ricci's reach to
the Title VII context alone. Ricci purports to be a statutory rather than a
constitutional case. But there is no question that in Ricci, "the Justices clearly
have constitutional issues in mind." 118 First, the "strong basis in evidence"
standard the Court grafted onto Title VII was taken directly from the equalprotection "affirmative action" context. Borrowing a standard from the
affirmative-action context suggests that the Court is synchronizing the Title
VII and the constitutional standards, raising constitutional questions about
the viability of Title VII' s disparate-impact provisions. 11 9
Second, the Court's affirmative-action jurisprudence has been
consistently friendly to white reverse-discrimination plaintiffs and hostile to
government actors seeking to take voluntary integrative action. 120 In Ricci,
the Court praised City of Richmond v. J A. Croson Co. 121 and Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education 122 as striking the appropriate balance between
"eliminating segregation and discrimination on the one hand and doing
away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race on the
other." 12 3 In both of those cases, there was a "head-to-head" competition
between blacks and whites for an important governmental benefit such as a
job or government contract. 12 4 In both cases, the Court ruled that the
affirmative action plan at issue was unconstitutional.125 Ricci cites these cases
as persuasive precedent, even though both cases involved explicit racial
classifications.
Third, the Court used a constitutional standard in deciding Ricci. The
standard the Court imported from the equal-protection context is a high
one. In Ricci, the Court ruled that the government must have a "strong basis
in evidence" in order to justify voluntary-compliance efforts under Title

l 18.
BREST ET AL., supra note 15, at 181.
119. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia,]., concurring).
120. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), is the proverbial exception that proves the
rule. But see, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (finding that a point allocation system
for freshman admissions that included race violated the Equal Protection Clause).
121. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
122. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
123. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675.
124. Croson, 488 U.S. at 481-83 (explaining that the city denied contractor's request for a
waiver of provision in the city's contested Minority Business Utilization Plan that required 30%
of the dollar amount of city contracts be subcontracted to Minority Business Enterprises);
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 271-72 (explaining that when "nonminority teachers were laid off, while
minority teachers with less seniority were retained" as a result of the school board's minority
retention agreement with the teacher's union, "[t]he displaced nonminority teachers" sued).
125. Croson, 488 U.S. at 486,511; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283-84.
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VII. 126 The "strong basis in evidence" question previously was only asserted
within a strict-scrutiny analysis in a constitutional context. Strict-scrutiny
review is the highest level of judicial review applied to classification schemes
under the Equal Protection Clause; it presumes the underlying
impermissibility of the challenged classification. 12 7 As a matter of equalprotection law, the question of whether a governmental defendant has a
"strong basis in evidence" measures the government's justification for an
affirmative-action plan that is otherwise unconstitutional. Thus, the Court's
shift in Ricci from a "good faith" standard to a "strong basis in evidence"
standard is a momentous change in Title VII law, signaling that defendants'
voluntary compliance efforts, which raise reverse-discrimination claims
under the disparate-treatment provisions of the statute, are presumptively
impermissible. 128
But Ricci is not just a "one-way" ratchet signaling a potential change in
direction in Title VII law toward pro-reverse discrimination in favor of
plaintiffs. The Court imported the "strong basis in evidence" standard in
order to resolve a tension it perceived between the disparate-treatment and
disparate-impact provisions within the statute. The conflict arose because
the Court assumed that New Haven's actions, refusing to certify examination
results, specifically taken to avoid disparate-impact liability, actually did
violate Title VII's disparate-treatment provision. Thus, there was an
irreconcilable conflict in New Haven's actions under the statute unless the
City could present an adequate defense.129 However, a conflict between the
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions in Title VII arises only if
the intent to remedy disparate impact is "equivalent to an intent to
discriminate against non-minority applicants." 1 3° The Court conceded that
the rationale for the City's action was to comply with Title VII's disparateimpact requirement. 1 31 But for the Court, the City's action in refusing to
certify · the examination results was "race-based,"'3 2 and therefore

126. 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
127. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 16-6, at 1451-52 (2d ed.
1988).
128. Cheryl I. Harris and Kimberly West-Faulcon persuasively argued, "Ricci effectively
imports strict scrutiny equal protection analysis into Title VII's substantive provisions by
requiring that an employer have a 'strong basis in evidence' for believing it is vulnerable to
disparate impact liability before it takes any action to avoid or mitigate disparate impact against
minorities." Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 85; see also Primus, supra note 5, at 134g-55
(discussing the Ricci Court's departure from the traditional view of the disparate-impact
doctrine).
129. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
130. Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 1999).
131. Rice~ 129 S. Ct. at 2664, 2673-74.
132. Id. at 2664.
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presumptively impermissible 1 33 under Title VII's disparate-treatment
provisions. The· problem, of course, is that "race-based" co1,Jld mean
anything. It could mean action taken to create or perpetuate a caste system,
or to racially stigmatize an individual, or to comply with the requirements of
federal anti-discrimination law.
Consequently, Ricci raises the following question: Is the government
prohibited from taking facially race-neutral action motivated by an
integrative intent? 1 34 There are two answers to this question: one is narrowly
doctrinal, and the other is more normative. As a doctrinal matter, Ricci does
not "hold" that facially neutral decisions intended to integrate are
unconstitutional. As the Court explained, "Title VII does not prohibit an
employer from considering, before administering a test or practice, how to
design that test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all
individuals, regardless of race." 1 35 Thus, it would be reading Ricci too
aggressively to suggest that ex ante, the government can take no facially raceneutral action that might have an adverse effect on white individuals. 1 36
Rather, the thrust of the Court's concern in Ricci is that the government
discarded the examination results only after it learned that "white candidates
had outperformed minority candidates." 1 37 The government's ex post
determination made all the difference.

133. Of course, one need not read the integrative legislative motive behind disparate
impact so broadly. Perhaps the disparate-impact provision of Title VII is intended to "integrate
the workplace only to the extent that existing hierarchies can be dismantled through the
elimination of irrational business practices." Primus, supra note 8, at 519. If this is the case, then
one argument is that Ricci is consistent with that view. After all, the Court ruled that the
petitioners were entitled to summary judgment on the Title VII claim because "[t]here is no
genuine dispute that the examinations were job-related and consistent with business necessity."
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678. In addition, the City lacked a strong basis in evidence that there was an
equally valid, less-discriminatory-testing alternative that it refused to adopt. Id. at 2679.
Essentially, the Court's view was that because there was an adequate business justification for
the promotion test, the City's failure to certify the results could not justify race-based
discrimination.
Thus, Ricci could stand for the more limited proposition that disparate impact targets
"not all segregation-perpetuating practices but only those that are not adequately justified by
the rational commercial interests of employers." Primus, supra note 8, at 532. The only problem
with this view is that the City was never given a chance to prove that its test lacked an adequate
business justification under the new Ricci standard. As Justice Ginsburg notes in dissent: "The
Court stacks the deck further by denying respondents any chance to satisfy the newly
announced strong-basis-in-evidence standard." Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2702 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Instead, the Court tries the case itself.
134. Again, this is not a fanciful question. See BREST ET AL., supra note 15, at 181-82.
135. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
136. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 207 (interpreting this portion of the Court's opinion to
mean that "the employer could have adopted its testing (or other practices) to minimize the
disparate impact, even though it could not invalidate a test, once it was given, for that reason").
137. 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
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The Ricci case concerns facially race-neutral government action
motivated by an integrative intent that was not strictly required by Title VII's
disparate-impact provisions and that caused racial harm. Ricci suggests that
because the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII intended to promote
workplace integration, facially neutral actions taken to achieve that purpose
are race-based and presumptively impermissible if and only if that action creates
racial harm. Ricci stands for the conclusion that the government may not take
action that ( 1) is race-based (now broadly interpreted) that (2) causes racial
harm that is not required to avoid disparate-impact liability.
This understanding of Ricci jibes with Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Parents Involved. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy stressed the harm to
individuals associated with racial-classification schemes. At the same time, he
articulated a broad vision of facially race-neutral, yet race-conscious, actions
that the government could take to eradicate de facto segregation without
triggering strict scrutiny. 1 38 Presumably, such actions would not harm
individual white students by stamping them with a governmentally ordained
racial label. Even though Ricci does not involve an explicit racialclassification scheme, one might understand both cases as dealing with the
same fundamental problem: How to assess the propriety of what the Court
perceives as "race-based" governmental action-whether claims against such
action are grounded in Title VII or equal protection, and whether the
government's action is explicitly race-conscious or facially race-neutral.
Thus, the issue in both cases is the same: Is there an adequate
justification for what the Court perceives as race-conscious action that
creates racial harm? Racial harm matters. Ricci suggests that the form of the
race-conscious action is secondary to the importance or visibility of the racial
harm. Finally, Ricci also suggests that facially race-neutral governmental
action with an integrative purpose, previously unobjected to, may well need
to now meet the requirements of strict-scrutiny review in order to survive
constitutional review.
But on a broader normative level, Ricci (and the Parents Involved
plurality) suggests that the Court is not only shifting away from the prointegrative approach that marked Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter,139
but is "waging war" on the very idea of discrimination itself. 1 4° After Ricci,
the issue is the size, nature, and explicitness of the effect on identifiable
reverse-discrimination plaintiffs. The lesson of Ricci for government actors is
not that governmental action taken with an integrative motive is always
prohibited (at least for now). 1 4 1 Instead, it is that the effects of the facially
neutral government action really matter. In Ricci, even though New Haven

138.
139.
140.
141.

See supra Part 111.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 116.
Although, I have demonstrated why Ricci raises this troubling possibility.
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did not use explicit racial classifications and was motivated by integrative
intent, the City's action affected identifiable individuals. As Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Parents Involved suggests, the Court is
particularly concerned about the harm caused by explicit racial
classifications, which tend to undercut individuality. But racial harm can
take many forms and need not always be embodied in racial classifications.
For instance, racial harm occurs when the government takes facially
race-neutral action that is motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 1 4 2 And, as
Ricci demonstrates, the Court is also concerned when the government takes
facially race-neutral action that creates racial harm with respect to important
social and economic benefits even where the government's primary motivation for
the facially neutral action is integrative. In this respect, Ricci moves the Court
one step further toward an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
that requires absolute governmental neutrality when it comes to race.
Moving forward, the challenge for the government is to design effective
facially race-neutral programs that do not entrench the status quo, open up
access to opportunity, provide for maximum racial integration, and do not
cause racial harm. But such an interpretation risks destabilizing and
ultimately subverting the term "discrimination."
IV. RESPONDING TO THE RACE-NEUTRALITY DEFAULT:
THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATION

A.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INIEGRATING THE WORKPLACE

Ricci raises the question of whether the government's desire to integrate
the workplace is itself a discriminatory purpose. In so doing, the Court
undervalues the integrative foundation of Title VII's disparate-impact
provisions and is acting out of step with previous doctrine. The disparateimpact provisions of Title VII seek, at least in part, to disestablish racial
segregation in American employment and address structural inequality. 1 43
As Richard A. Primus explained, there are a variety of motives for disparateimpact law and there is no consensus as to its legislative motive. 1 44 However,
one leading possibility is that the legislative motive undergirding disparateimpact law is to integrate the workplace. 1 45 Indeed, one argument is that the
workplace is the single most promising domain for integrating adults in
American society. 1 46 Thus, disparate impact prohibits facially neutral
142. See supra Part 11.B.
143. Primus, supra note 8, at 523-24.
144. Id. at 518 (" [T]here has long been a dispute over whether disparate impact doctrine is
an evidentiary dragnet designed to discover hidden instances of intentional discrimination or a
more aggressive attempt to dismantle racial hierarchies regardless of whether anything like
intentional discrimination is present.").
145. Id. at 523-32.
146. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY g (2003). Estlund argues:

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:837

workplace practices that ""'freeze" the status quo' and permit the legacy of
prior discrimination to perpetuate itself." 1 47 Racial segregation in education,
employment, housing and other areas of American life is a "primary
impediment to achieving structural equality" 1 48 for African-Americans and
other minority group members. Government attempts to integrate the races
directly addresses these ongoing, persistent, and path-dependent processes
that structure access to opportunity in American society. 1 49
On this view, disparate-impact liability exists to eliminate the selfperpetuating mechanisms of racial segregation in American employment,
which operate regardless of any discriminatory intent or racial animus on
the part of the employer. 1 5° As Primus puts it in elaborating on how
disparate impact is intended to integrate the workplace:
After legal discrimination ended, whites on average still enjoyed
better educational and occupational opportunities than blacks,
with the result that employers who selected employees based on
educational and occupational qualifications tended to hire whites
over blacks even if they were not motivated by an intent to
discriminate. That pattern can reproduce itself from generation to
generation. To the considerable extent that the occupational
success of parents shapes the educational and occupational
opportunities of their children, and given the low rate of

The single most promising arena of racial integration-at least for adults-is the
workplace. This is not to say that the typical workplace is genuinely integrated, but
that even the partial demographic integration that does exist in the workplace
yields far more social integration-actual interracial interaction and friendshipthan any other domain of American society.
Id.

147. Primus, supra note 8, at 524.
148. Adams, supra note 72, at 275.
149. See john a. powell, The Tensions Between Integration and School Reform, 28 HAsTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 655, 683-85 (2001). powell states:
. The positive effects of desegregation in the schools start with the students but
permeate far beyond the immediate environs of students. Students of color "who
attend more integrated schools have increased academic achievement and higher
test scores." These increases have been credited to, among other factors, better
resource access and enhanced motivation or competition. Attending a more
desegregated school translates into heightened goals for future educational
attainment and career, whereas being educated in a racially segregated
environment is associated with lower educational attainment and career goals ....
. . . Indeed, [the harm of segregation and subordination] is not limited to negative
impacts on students' achievement, but reaches into and damages our democratic
structure-reifying racial subordination in employment, health, wealth access, and
political participation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
150. Primus, supra note 8, at 523-24.
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intermarriage between whites and blacks, applying neutral criteria
to haves and have-nots alike could help keep blacks an underclass
in the workforce even if employers held no bias in favor of
maintaining that state of affairs. 1 5 1
This understanding of the purpose of disparate-impact law is consistent
with my vision of "radical integration." 1 5 2 Radical integration moves beyond
the standard assumption that integration is relevant only in educational
settings where the positive externalities associated with intergroup contact
are most commonly appreciated. Instead, radical integration recognizes that
integration necessarily requires assimilation and lacks any structural or
material component. 1 53 Radical integration-properly conceived-embraces
both "the expectation that race mixing under conditions of social equality
would break down racial stereotypes and allow members of each group to
appreciate a common, shared humanity, and ... the belief that integration
would eradicate the advantages whites had accrued through segregation." 1 54
But if integration equals discrimination, then all governmental integration
efforts-even if undertaken using race-neutral mean.r--are suspect and
potentially even unconstitutional.
B.

GRUTIER V. BOLLINGER (AFTER PARENTS INVOLVED AND RICCI)

Looking back on the Court's decision in Grutter after Parents Involved
and Ricci, the question becomes: Why wasn't Barbara Grutter invited to the
party? Surely she had just as strong (and perhaps even a stronger) equalprotection argument as the students who were denied their choice of public
schools in Parents Involved, or the firefighters seeking promotions in Ricci.
Moreover, Grutter involved an explicit racial-classification scheme rather
than a facially race-neutral determination.
At issue in Grutter was the University of Michigan Law School's
affirmative-action plan that used race as a "plus" factor in its admissions
scheme. 1 55 Barbara Grutter, a white resident of the state of Michigan,
applied to the law school and was rejected. 1 56 She sued, alleging that the law
school's admissions scheme violated her rights under the Equal Protection
Clause because it gave "applicants who belong to certain minority groups 'a
significantly greater chance of admission than students with similar
credentials from disfavored racial groups."' 1 57 In a celebrated and much
151. Id. (footnote omitted).
152. See generally Adams, supra note 72 (defining radical integration as a concept
encompassing both desegregation and associational and material equality).
153. See generally id. (arguing that radical integration, a part of which is individualistic
assimilation, should be advanced as both a political and a social goal).
154- Id. at 272 (footnote omitted).
155. 539 U.S. 306,321, 334-35 (2003).
156. Id.at316.
157. Id.at317.
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scrutinized decision authored by Justice O'Connor, the Court ruled that the
law school's admissions scheme did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 1 58
The ruling hinged on two key pivots: the deferential application of strict
scrutiny and the importance the Court placed on racial integration both to
the law school and to society more generally. The law school's admissions
plan employed a racial-classification scheme, thus triggering strict scrutiny.
But at the outset, the Court opined:
Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict
scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it. . . . Not every decision
influenced by race is equally objectionable and strict scrutiny is
designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the
importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the
governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular
context. 1 59
Thus, the Court signaled that it might uphold the law school's admissions
scheme if the school's justification for the use of race was important enough
to overcome the constitutional presumption against it. In Grutter, there is
little question that the Court applied strict scrutiny in a relaxed, deferential
fashion. 160
The Court explained that it would defer to the law school in employing
the strict-scrutiny framework. 161 Indeed, the Court deferred to the law
school's judgment as to the importance of diversity to the law school's
mission and with respect to the means the law school used to achieve that
diversity. 162 The interest the Grutter Court found compelling was the law
school's use of race to obtain the "educational benefits that flow from a

158. Id. at 343.
159. Id. at 326-27.
160. See id. at 328 ("Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of
deference to a university's academic decisions .... "); see also id. at 350, 361-67 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Nor does the Constitution countenance the
unprecedented deference the Court gives to the Law School, an approach inconsistent with the
very concept of 'strict scrutiny."'); id. at 380 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) ("Although the Court
recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is
unprecedented in its deference."); id. at 388, 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court
confuses deference to a university's definition of its educational objective with deference to the
implementation of this goal .... Deference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with
it.").
161. Id. at 328 (majority opinion) ("Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the law school
is no less strict for taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies
primarily within the expertise of the university.").
162. Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 947-54 (2008)
(asserting that the Grutter Court deferred to the law school on both the compelling-interest and
narrow-tailoring prongs of the strict-scrutiny test).
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diverse student body." 163 But that interest had universal, extra-educational
effects including better workforce outcomes, increased corporate
competiveness and military readiness, and the enhancement of a multi-racial
citizenry and legitimate leadership class. 164 Grutter recognized the
importance of racial integration to American society and upheld a
government actor's explicit use of racial classifications because of it. So one
answer to the question of why Barbara Grutter wasn't invited to the party is
that the Court in Grutter was persuaded that the societal interests in
integration outweighed the harm to the plaintiff given the nature of the
multivariate admission-selection mechanism the law school used. 165
Moreover, the Court ruled that the law school's admissions scheme was
narrowly tailored to achieve the benefits of racial diversity because it used
individual determinations and did not "make[] an applicant's race or
ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application." 166 Race was just one
factor among many in the admissions determination. 167 Additionally, the
decision to take account of race was made ex ante and not .ex post in
response to discovering that a disproportionately white class had been
admitted and whose admission offers were rescinded. 168 Thus, the law
school's admission process did not unduly burden individual white
applicants-in other words, it did not create racial harm. 169
Contrast the Court's minimization of the potential racial harm in Grutter
to the Court's perception of the school districts' use of race in Parents
Involved. In Parents Involved, the Court ruled that the student-assignment
plans were not narrowly tailored because:
[Race] is not simply one factor weighed with others in reaching a
decision, as in Grutter, it is the factor. Like the University of
Michigan undergraduate plan struck down in Gratz, the plans here
163. 539 U.S. at 343.
164. Adams, supra note 162, at 948-53.
165. Id. at 949 (asserting that the GrutterCourt balanced the public benefits associated with
integration against the harm to frustrated white applicants that "is minimized through
appropriate attention to their interests throughout the admissions process").
166. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
167. See id. at 318-20. Indeed, this might help to explain the contrasting outcome in Gratz.
Compare id. at 338 ("[T]he Law School actually gives substantial weight to diversity factors
besides race. The Law School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test
scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants (and other nonminority applicants)
who are rejected. This shows that the Law School seriously weighs many other diversity factors
besides race that can make a real and dispositive difference for nonminority applicants as well."
(citation omitted)), with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 247, 253-54 (2003) (although the
university's undergraduate admission's office considered "a number of factors in making
admissions decisions," its automatic distribution of 20 points to every single applicant from an
underrepresented minority group "ha[d] the effect of making the 'factor of race ... decisive'
for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant").
168. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318.
169. Id. at 341.
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"do not provide for a meaningful individualized review of
applicants" but instead rely on racial classifications in a
"nonindividualized, mechanical" way. 1 7°
Thus, the student-assignment plans at issue in Parents Involved created
significant racial harm by reducing "children to racial chits valued and
traded according to one school's supply and another's demand." 1 71 For
Justice Kennedy, this harm was so great that it could not be mitigated by
otherwise permissible objectives: the school districts' desire to ameliorate
the effects of de facto segregation and increase racial diversity in the schools.
Now compare the Court's perception of racial harm in Grutter to Ricci.
Consider Ricci's overarching focus on racial harm and the vested-rights
orientation of the majority opinion. The very first paragraph of the Ricci
opinion describes how much firefighters prize their promotions, that
officers command respect within the department and the broader
community, that officers receive increased salary and responsibility, and that
there is "intense competition for promotions" within the New Haven Fire
Department.'7 2 The first paragraph ends by tying the much sought-after
promotions to the City's objective selection mechanism (the promotion
tests) intended to "identify the best qualified candidates." 1 73 The next two
paragraphs describe how promotion examinations were "infrequent, so the
stakes were high" and that "[m]any firefighters studied for months, at
considerable personal and financial cost"; and how these facts implied that
the City acted in a biased and race-based manner when it discarded the test
results after it became clear that "white candidates had outperformed
minority candidates." 1 74
The key point here is that the Ricci Court depicts the petitioners as
possessing a vested right to a highly valuable social, reputational, and
economic benefit by virtue of their performance on the promotion
examination.' 75 The City therefore dispossessed the petitioners of the vested
right to their promotions by refusing to certify the test results. Thus, the
conflict between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of
170. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723 (2007)
(citation omitted) (quoting Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276, 280 (O'Connor,]., concurring)).
171. Id. at 798 (Kennedy,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
172. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
173. Id.
174. Id. This implication arises in tlie third paragraph of tlie opinion. In tliat paragraph,
the Court describes tlie examination results, tlie public debate tliat ensued after tliose results
became public, and how each side in tlie debate argued for tlieir respective positions. Id. In
describing how tlie City resolved tlie dispute, tlie Court implied tliat tlie City simply sided with
tlie minority applicants over tlie white applicants ratlier tlian attempting to come into
compliance witli federal law: "In the end tlie City took tlie side of tliose who protested tlie test
results. It tlirew out tlie examinations." Id.
175. See id. at 2690 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting) (stating that petitioners had no "vested right"
to tlie promotion).
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Title VII arises because of the Court's core belief that the City
"discriminated" against the petitioners in the disparate0 treatment sense by
taking something valuable from them solely on the basis of their race.
In Grutter, the Court takes exactly the opposite position. The Court
defers to the law school's judgment about the value of racial diversity to the
education mission 1 76 and characterizes the admissions process as
individualized, fluid, and multi-faceted, thus foreclosing any argument that
Barbara Grutter had a vested right to be admitted to the law school. 1 77 It
describes strict scrutiny as "not 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' 1 78 The
Court's approach in Grutterstands in stark contrast to its approach in Parents
Involved and Ricci, both decided just a few terms later. There is no question
that the Grutter Court sees a meaningful distinction between the
government's use of race to obtain a diverse student body and the kind of
race discrimination practiced in the ''.Jim Crow South"; but by the time of
Ricci, a plurality of the Court perceived no such distinction. Thus, the
Court's approach "threatens to conflate the two." 1 79 At the risk of sounding
too reductionist, it is hard to imagine that the change in the composition of
the Court in the interim had no impact on the Court's approach in the two
later cases. After Grutterwas decided in 2003, Chief Justice Roberts replaced
Chief Justice Rehnquist in September 2005, and Justice Alito replaced
Justice O'Connor in January 2006. 180 And while Justice Kennedy did not
sign onto the most troubling portions of the plurality opinion in Parents
Involved, he provided the critical fifth vote necessary to strike down the
student-assignment plans at issue. Thus, the Court stands at a crossroads:
Will it reaffirm the integrative approach it approved in Grutter, or will it
dismantle that precedent by undermining· the critical distinction between
racial discrimination and government action taken to ameliorate its effects?
C.

FACIAL RACE NEUTRALITY AS A SAFE HARBOR· PERCENTAGE PLANS

Racial-classification schemes trigger strict scrutiny. To pass
constitutional muster, they must be narrowly tailored to a compelling state
interest. 181 The Court routinely insists, as it considers racial-classification
schemes, that the government consider race-neutral alternatives, in

176. 539 U.S. 306, 328-30 (2003).
177. ld.at337.
178. Id. at 326 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 237
(1995)).
179. Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 19 (stating that the Court in Ricci is engaged in an
"ideological battle to deem even thinking about race or racial effects as equivalent to race
discrimination, race-conscious anti-racist law in every domain-education, voting rights and
employment-is now being challenged as racist").
180. · See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://
www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited Jan. 2, 2011).
18 1. See supra Part II.A.
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accordance with the narrowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny. 182 Where
available and efficient race-neutral alternatives exist, the Court has found
unconstitutional government action that does not employ these race-neutral
means. 18 3 The Court's preference for race-neutral alternatives designed to
achieve the same ends as racial-classification schemes indicates its
acceptance of the underlying objectives of many affirmative-action plans and
integration more generally.
In Grutter, the United States, as amicus curiae for petitioner Barbara
Grutter, took the position that the University of Michigan Law School could
use facially race-neutral measures to "ensure that universities and other
public institutions are open to all and that student bodies are experientially
diverse and broadly representative of the public." 184 Indeed, the United
States' position was that schools could, consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause, reject selection methods that had an adverse impact on educational
diversity. 18 5 Thus, in the United States' view, nothing in the Constitution
prohibited the law school from pursuing "goals, such as experiential
diversity, that have had the effect of ensuring minority access to institutions
of higher learning." 186 Essentially, the United States did not understand a
facially race-neutral plan, which sought to obtain racial diversity, to be
impermissibly race-based. 18 7 On this view, ensuring minority access to the
law school, that is, integrating it, was not a discriminatory purpose. The
United States took a binary approach: Race-conscious means are
constitutionally impermissible, but race-neutral means with exactly the same

182. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 ("Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every
conceivable race-neutral alternative .... Narrow tailoring does, however, require serious, good
faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the
university seeks."); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-38 ("The Court of Appeals ... did not address the
question of narrow tailoring in terms of our strict scrutiny cases, by asking, for example,
whether there was 'any consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority
business participation' in government contracting .... " (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,507 (1989))).
183. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in me judgment) (outlining me race-neutral
alternatives mat he believed could have accomplished me school districts' integrative goals);
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328, 340 (deferring to school administrators' "educational judgment mat
... diversity is essential to its educational mission" and finding mat me school "sufficiently
considered workable race-neutral alternatives" and appropriately rejected them because "mese
alternatives would require a dramatic sacrifice of diversity, me academic quality of all admitted
students, or bom").
184. Brief for me United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Grutter, 539
U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 176635.
185. Id. at 13-14 ("Schools may identify and discard facially neutral criteria mat, in
practice, tend to skew admissions in a manner mat detracts from educational diversity.")
186. Id. at 17.
187. Id. at 13-14, 17.
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integrative objective as the race-conscious means are constitutionally
permissible. 188 ·
More specifically, the United States suggested that the University of
Michigan Law School could obtain racial diversity by relying on "percentage
plans," which guarantee admission to all students above a certain class-rank
threshold in every high school in the state. 189 The United States asserted
that percentage plans are facially race-neutral because they use the
mechanism of high-school class rank rather than race to determine college
acceptance. 1 9° However, the Court ruled that the law school's current
admissions scheme was sufficiently narrowly tailored because the law school
had considered feasible race-neutral alternatives. 1 9 1 The Court opined that
even assuming that percentage plans were race-neutral, they were not a
workable substitute for an explicitly race-conscious admission scheme. 1 9 2
The Court's concern about percentage plans as a viable race-neutral
substitute was two-fold: First, percentage plans determine college acceptance
based on high-school class rank. There was no explanation of how
percentage plans might apply to law school admissions. 1 93 Second,
percentage plans are inconsistent with individualized assessments. Thus,
even assuming that percentage plans are race-neutral, "they may preclude
the university from conducting the individualized assessments necessary to
assemble a student body that is not just racially diverse, but diverse along all
the qualities valued by the university." 1 94 Thus, there was no obligation for
the law school to consider percentage plans prior to employing racial
classifications in its admissions scheme. 1 95
If percentage plans are race-neutral and presumptively constitutional as
a result, it is hard to see why other government action that is not explicitly
race-based, but which attempts to achieve racial diversity, should be viewed
any differently. Percentage plans are facially race-neutral, yet at the same
time race-dependent. The only reason percentage plans exist is to substitute
for racially explicit admission schemes-they have no other purpose. 1 96

188. Id.
189. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003).
190. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 184, at
14-18.
191. Orutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40.
192. Id. at 340.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. While the Court assumed for purposes of the narrow-tailoring analysis that
percentage plans are race-neutral, it did not so rule. The Court did not reach the question of
whether percentage plans violated the Equal Protection Clause because the plans are motivated
by an impermissible discriminatory purpose.
196. See Michelle Adams, Isn't It Ironic? The Central Paradox at the Heart of "Percentage Plans,"
62 OHIO ST. LJ. 1729, 1737 (2001) (describing the genesis of the Texas "Ten Percent Plan,"
which was created in direct response to HojJwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated
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Percentage plans are motivated by the government's desire to achieve racial
diversity, thus they are "racially" motivated. Of course, the operative
question here is whether this racial motivation amounts only to an
unobjectionable Shaw-Miller-style "awareness of race," 1 97 or whether we have
entered the realm of discriminatory purpose. Perhaps percentage plans are
saved by Feeney, in that governmental action is not taken "because of' its
adverse impact on non-minority students, but rather "in spite of' it. 1 9 8 But
the United States' position in Grutter was not that there was insufficient
evidence of discriminatory purpose necessary to trigger Davis and Feeney, but
instead that percentage plans raise no equal-protection concerns at all. 1 99
Percentage plans demonstrate that a governmental action taken
"because of' race is both relative and epistemic. The thrust of the United
States' amicus brief in Grutter is that percentage plans are constitutionally
unobjectionable when compared with old-fashioned race-based affirmative
action. But percentage plans (and by extension other types of facially raceneutral action taken with an intent to increase racial integration) may look
very different standing alone, when there is no explicit racial classification
available for comparison. The question of whether a governmental action is
taken "because of' race is also epistemic in the sense that it depends on
some view or conception of what race-based action "is." The thrust of the
United States' position vis-a-vis percentage plans in Grutter is that they raise
no constitutional concerns. But this position depends upon a fixed view or
definition of race-based action. That is, race-based action means a public
university's explicit use of race as a (and perhaps the) deciding factor in an
admissions scheme. On this view, "because of' race does not include actions
focused on identifiable individuals taken to achieve exactly the same ends as
a racial-classification scheme where there are few or no identifiable
plaintiffs.
Percentage plans tell us three things about what "because of' race
means. Perhaps percentage plans raise no equal-protection concerns
because their predominant motive is integration. Certainly the government
employs percentage plans "because of' their ability to racially diversify

by Gruttcr, 539 U.S. 306, invalidating the University of Texas Law School's race-based admissions
scheme).
197. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. goo, 916 (1995) ("Redistricting legislatures will, for
example, almost always be aware of racial demographics; but it does not follow that race
predominates in the redistricting process."); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641-42, 644 (1993)
("This Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all
circumstances.").
198. 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
199. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 184,
at 22 ("Absent such impermissible race-based admissions decisions, university officials may
pursue whatever mix of goals they deem appropriate. They are free to pursue goals, such as
experiential diversity, that have had the effect of ensuring minority access to institutions of
higher learning.").
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college campuses, not "because of' a desire to further segregate the public
schools: 20° First, in the context of traditional affirmative action, the
governmental motivation for the facially neutral rule is less important than
the expression of that motivation. This is why racial-classification schemes
themselves are deeply problematic. Racial classifications (whether
constructive or actual) present certain expressive harms that may not be
present in facially race-neutral government action, even if the motivation for
both is the same. Second, identifiable victims matter even if the form of the
government's action is facially race-neutral. The appeal of percentage plans
lies in the fact that they generate racial diversity in a diffuse manner that
does not frame the admissions determination as a head-to-head competition
between differentially qualified applicants for a limited pool of a highly
sought-after benefit. 201 There may be white "victims" of percentage plansdepending, of course, on how one defines "merit"-but they are far less
identifiable than under an admissions system that uses explicit racial
classifications. 202
Finally, the acceptability of percentage plans as an appropriate
substitute for explicit race-conscious action suggests another view of what
"because of' race means (or doesn't mean). However, percentage plans are
deeply entwined with racial segregation on a geographical level. That is,
percentage plans are premised on racially segregated schools: "[S]chool
attendance areas were based on the neighborhood in which the school was
located, it was inevitable that the schools would also become more

200. See Editorial, Fighting School R.esegregation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at A24 (asserting
that percentage plans tell "minority parents that their children's best chance of attending a
good college is to attend a segregated high school, [and thus] these programs exert pressure on
minority communities not to fight for integration in court, or in their school districts").
201. There is, however, substantial dispute as to whether percentage plans have succeeded
in generating significant racial diversity in public colleges and universities. See Jack Greenberg,
Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521,
547 & n.165 (2002) ("[T]he United States Commission on Civil Rights and its chair have
criticized the Texas and Florida [percentage] plans because Florida and Texas have not
admitted to college the same proportion of minority students as were admitted under
affirmative action."); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action
and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 315-16 & fig.2 (2001) (arguing that a
comparison of in-state applicants to the University of Texas at Austin under the Ten Percent
Plan does not show a disparate impact on white students).
202. See Roger Clegg, Affirmative Action, the Federal Government, and President Bush: A
Conservative View, HUM. RTS., Spring 2001, at 10, 19 (criticizing percentage plans and arguing
that "[t]here's no good reason for colleges to ignore SAT scores [in the admissions
determination], and there's no good reason to assume that all high schools educate students
equally well");Janet McLaren, Top IO Percent Plan Under Fire, BATTALION (Tex.), Apr. 14, 2003,
available
at
http:/ /www.thebatt.com/2.8500/top-10-percent-plan-under-fire-1. 1210226
(reporting that "[s]ince the [Texas] top 10 policy was adopted, more students with low SAT
scores have enrolled at A&M," and quoting a student at Texas A&M who stated: "The plan
discriminates against whites and non-favored minorities including Asians .... The best answer
is a system based 100 percent on merit." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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segregated" as a byproduct of racially segregated neighborhoods and
metropolitan areas. 20 3 Not only are percentage plans unimaginable without
affirmative action, they are ineffective without racial segregation. 204
Percentage plans build upon residential segregation to deliver racially
diverse undergraduate classes to public colleges and universities. 20 5 Indeed,
residential segregation is required in order for percentage plans to work as
intended. 206
As Benjamin Forest explains, "Although the plan guarantees admission
to the top 10% from every high school, a disproportionate number of
students in this group will be white so long as the average score (or GPA) of
minority students is lower than the average of white students." 20 7 Forest
continues, "As a result, only schools with a very high percentage of minority
students will have a large number of these students in the top decile." 208
Consequently, such plans "shift the construction of racial identity from a
discrete, individual action-marking race on applications-to the collective
action required to maintain racial segregation in housing and secondary
schools." 20 9 Yet, the United States advocated strongly for percentage plans in
its Grutterbrief. 210 Percentage plans may have a segregative effect (or at least
reify existing segregation),2u but unless such an effect is so overwhelming
203. KATHRYN M. NECKERMAN, SCHOOLS BETRAYED: ROOTS OF FAILURE IN INNER-CITY
EDUCATION 84 (2007); see al.so Deborah L. McKoy & Jeffrey M. Vincent, Housing and Education:
The Inextricable Link, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR .AMERICA 125, 125-50 Qames H.
Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008) (emphasizing the relationship between school quality
and residential patterns).
204. See Greenberg, supra note 201, at 546; see al.so Marta Tienda & Sunny Xinchun Niu,
Capitalizing on Segregation, Pretending Neutrality: College Admissions and the Texas Top Io% Law, 8

AM. L. & ECON. REV. 312, 315 (2006) ("Although touted as a race-neutral admissions regime,
we confirm that the success of the top 10% law in restoring diversity to the public flagships
resulted because of pervasive race and ethnic segregation in Texas public high schools.").
205. See OFFICE FOR MULTICULTURAL & ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF MINN., FREQUENTLY
AsKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE USE OF RACE-CONSCIOUS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 1 ( 2003), available at http://blog.lib.umn.edu/ trano410/ soc32 51 / affirm 1.
pdf; B. Forest, Hidden Segregation? The Limits of Geographically Based Affirmative Action, 21 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 855 (2002).
206. Tienda & Niu, supra note 204, at 314, 341.
207. Forest, supra note 205, at 856.
208. Id.; see al.so OFFICE FOR MULTICULTURAL & ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, supra note 205, at 1
("Percentage plans work best in areas where housing tends to be segregated, namely, where
there are large neighborhoods with high concentrations of families from like backgrounds.
These neighborhood schools tend to be segregated and characterized by racial isolation,
resulting in proportionate numbers of students of different backgrounds in the top percentage
of their high school classes.").
209. Forest, supra note 205, at 856.
21 o. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 184, at
14-17.
211. Forest, supra note 205, at 857 ("The development of the Texas Plan reflects the
acceptance of segregation at the local level as an inevitable, naturai' phenomenon even as it
acknowledges the importance of racial diversity at the scale of the university.").
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that it suggests discriminatory intent, it raises no equal-protection concerns.
Thus, the concept of "because of' race does not include facially race-neutral,
yet race-dependent, government action where the effect on white students is
diffuse and amorphous, even if the racial diversity the government seeks
cannot be obtained in the absence of racial segregation.
V.

TEST CAsE: THE NATIONAL OPPORTUNITY VOUCHER PROGRAM

In Ricci, the Court characterizes the City's desire to avoid disparateimpact liability as "race-based" and presumptively impermissible. 212 Even
though the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII are intended to integrate
the workplace, 21 3 Ricci raises the possibility that the government is
prohibited from taking facially race-neutral action motivated by an
integrative intent. This possibility is worth examining because if the Court
were to more fully embrace this position, a wide range of facially neutral, yet
pro-integrative, governmental actions might be at risk.
One prominent, recent example of such governmental actions at risk is
the NOVP. 21 4 In July 2009, the Poverty and Race Research Action Council
proposed that the federal government set aside 50,000 housing vouchers "to
help low income families and children in high poverty, segregated
neighborhoods move to higher opportunity communities with low poverty,
high performing schools." 21 5 At its core, the NOVP is an integration
measure. The NOVP is a voluntary housing-mobility program intended to
allow housing-voucher holders living in economically and racially segregated
neighborhoods to move to areas that "have less than the regional average
minority population" with schools with low rates of student poverty. 216 The
NOVP builds explicitly on the success of the Chicago housing-mobility
program challenged and upheld in HiUs v. Gautreaux,2 1 7 which achieved and
sustained "a measure of racial and economic integration." 218 Thus, the
NOVP is the culmination of several earlier housing-mobility proposals
212. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
213. Primus, supra note 8, at 523-32.
214. POVER1Y & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, A NATIONAL 0PPORTUNI1Y VOUCHER
PROGRAM: A BRIDGE TO QUALI1Y, INTEGRATED EDUCATION FOR Low INCOME CHILDREN (2009),
available at http://www.prrac.org/ pdf/National0pportunityVoucherProgram 7-15-09. pelf.
215. Id.at1.
216. Id. at 2.
217. See 425 U.S. 284 (1976). See generally James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J. Popkin, The
Gautreaux Program: An Experiment in Racial and Economic Integration, BPI NEWSL. (Bus. & Profl
People for the Pub. Interest, Chi., Ill.), Apr. 1990, at 3-4 (discussing the positive effects of the
Gautreaux Program as it "provided a metropolitan-wide remedy for discrimination in Chicago's
public housing"); The Gautreaux Housing Mobility Program, BUS. & PROF'L PEOPLE FOR THE PUB.
INTEREST, http:/ /www.bpichicago.org/HousingMobilityPrograms.php (last visited Jan. 2, 2011)
(analyzing how the lives of people who moved to low poverty areas under the mobility program
dramatically improved).
218. See LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR
LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA lo (2000).
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intended to enhance racial integration and provide low-income minoritygroup members with access to greater social and economic opportunities. 21 9
The NOVP would use a revised version of the current Housing Choice
Voucher Program as a vehicle to deconcentrate race and poverty. 220 The
existing Housing Choice Voucher Program provides housing vouchers to
very low-income families, which allow those families to secure housing in the
private-housing market that meets certain program requirements. 221 Under
the Housing Choice Voucher Program, the "participant is free to choose any
housing that meets the requirements of the program and is not limited to
units located in subsidized housing projects." 222 Eligible participants are not
primed to make an integrated-housing choice. Consequently, many Housing
Choice Voucher Program participants "live in economically and racially
segregated neighborhoods; this is particularly true for black and Hispanic
households. "22 3
Under the NOVP, 50,000 housing choice vouchers per year would be
set aside to assist families in integrative moves, thus converting 50,000
generic housing choice vouchers under the current Housing Choice
Voucher Program into "opportunity vouchers." 22 4 For the 2009 fiscal year,
Congress appropriated approximately $16.8 billion to fund the Housing

219. For instance, in 2005, almost 200 social scientists signed a pennon urging the
government to provide housing-mobility assistance to individuals displaced by Hurricane
Katrina. See Xavier de Souza Briggs, After Katrina: Rebuilding Places and Lives, 5 CnY &
COMMUNI1Y 119, i27-28 (2006), availabk at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/pclfs/
briggskatrinao206.pclf (reproducing the "Scholar's Petition" in the appendix). The petition
asserted that "[a]s the nation seeks to find housing for the many who have been left homeless,
our goal for these low-income displaced persons, most of whom are racial minorities, should be
to create a 'move to opportunity."' Id. at 127. The petition cited scientific research indicating
that "moving to lower poverty, lower risk neighborhoods and school districts can have
significant positive effects on the well-being and economic opportunity of low-income children
and their families." Id. at 128. The thrust of the petition was to link location to opportunity (or
lack thereof) and to urge the government to provide federal rental-housing subsidies to persons
displaced by Katrina so that they could relocate to lower poverty and implicitly less racially
segregated neighborhoods. Id.; see also Alexander Polikoff, Racial Inequality and the Black Ghetto,
POVER1Y & RACE NEWSL. (Poverty & Race Research Action Council, Wash., D.C.), Nov.-Dec.
2004, at 1, 8, availab/,e at http://www.prrac.org/newsletters/novdec2oo4.pclf (calling for a
national Gautreaux program that would earmark 50,000 housing-choice vouchers "for use by
black families living in urban ghettos, [to] be used only in non-ghetto locations-say, census
tracts with less than 10% poverty and not minority impacted").
2 20. POVER1Y & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, supra note 214, at 1.
2 21. Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., http:/ /www.hud.
gov/offices/pih/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet.cfm (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). Eligible
participants benefit financially from the program in that a "housing subsidy is paid to the
landlord directly by the [public housing authority] on behalf of the participating family. The
family then pays the difference between the actual rent charged by the landlord and the
amount subsidized by the program." Id.
222. Id.
2 2 3. See POVER1Y & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, supra note 214, at 1.
224. Id.
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Choice Voucher Prograrn, 22 5 and roughly 2 million vouchers were available
for eligible participants nationally. 226 Thus, the NOVP would allocate 2.5%
of the total housing-voucher pool for opportunity vouchers. These new
opportunity vouchers would be available only to families living in highpoverty neighborhoods in the thirty most segregated metropolitan areas in
the nation. 22 7 Under the NOVP, participants would be free to use
opportunity vouchers to secure any housing that meets program
requirements. 228 However, the NOVP would provide significant mobility,
regional information, and counseling to participants in order to facilitate
opportunity moves. 22 9 Thus, the NOVP is facially race-neutral; it does not
allocate a governmental benefit (here, a housing voucher) to specific
individuals on the basis of race. Instead, it uses the mechanism of
geography-and more specifically residential segregation-to allocate a
housing benefit and create integrated-housing opportunities.
One argument is that after Ricci, the NOVP (or similar mobility
program) is constitutionally problematic. Unfortunately, this argument is
not as farfetched as it might seem. Ricci lays out (and takes sides in) a central
debate in anti-discrimination law: what the distinction is between
governmental action taken "because of' race and government neutrality
when it comes to race. 2 3° Under Ricci's logic, the government does not act
neutrally when it takes action to integrate the workplace or other setting to
avoid a racially disparate impact. Along these lines, one might argue that the
NOVP expresses "non-neutrality" when it comes to race and is therefore
suspect. Indeed, Justice Scalia's concurrence in Ricci takes this point one
step further. Justice Scalia interprets race-based action very broadly to
225. Department of Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
111-8, 123 Stat. 950, 952 (2009); see also Linda Couch, Housing Choice Vouchers, NAT'L Low
INCOME HOUSING COALITION (May 6, 2009), http://www.nlihc.org/detail/article.cfm?article_
id=6049&id= 19 ( tracing the history of the voucher program and its steady growth).
226. See Couch, supra note 225; see also CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY
BASICS: THE HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM l (2009), http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-15o3hous. pdf (explaining the purposes and benefits of the voucher program).
2 27. POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, supra note 214, at 1.
228. In this respect, the NOVP proposal differs from Alexander Polikoff's recent call for a
National Gautreaux Program. Under the Polikoff plan, housing vouchers could only be used
"in non-ghetto locations-say, census tracts with less than 10% poverty and not minority
impacted." See Polikoff, supra note 219, at 8.
2 29. POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, supra note 2 14, at 1.
230. This tension in discrimination law has taken a variety of forms. Take, for instance,
Professor Herbert Wechsler's critique of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as
lacking a neutral principle justifying its result. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-35 ( 1959). Wechsler's view was that the central issue
in Brown boiled down to a question of competing associational rights; blacks wanted to associate
with whites, whites did not wish for the association. Id. at 34. For Wechsler, the question was
how to break the tie, a question not susceptible to judicial review. Id. Wechsler argued that the
Court's ruling in Brown simply favored blacks over whites, and thus it lacked a neutral principle.
Id. at 31-33. On this view, Brown was the product of unrestrained judicial activism. Id.
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include governmental action that requires "employers to evaluate the racial
outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of)
those racial outcomes." 2 3 1 Moreover, for Justice Scalia, an integrative
(benign) motive for the governmental action would not vindicate the
statute. 2 32 Justice Scalia appears to take the view that the disparate-impact
provisions of Title VII are unconstitutional because they require the
gov<:!rnment to take race-based action that is otherwise prohibited under the
Equal Protection Clause. 2 33
Were the federal government to adopt the NOVP, a suit by white
plaintiffs alleging that the NOVP violates the Equal Protection Clause is not
unimaginable for several reasons. First, there is a history of opposition to
housing-mobility programs from receiving neighborhoods. 2 34 Second, white
plaintiffs have already used the courts to prevent low-income minority-group
members fro,m using federal housing assistance in their neighborhoods.
In Walker v. City of Mesquite, white plaintiffs alleged that a public-housing
authority's construction of two new public-housing projects adjacent to their
neighborhoods violated the Equal Protection Clause, even though the
projects were a court-ordered remedy for past discrimination and
segregation in Dallas's public-housing programs. 2 35 The plaintiffs argued
that the remedial order requiring that "one hundred newly constructed
replacement units be built in a predominantly white area of Dallas" was an
impermissible racial-classification scheme that intentionally discriminated
against them on the basis of their race. 2 36 Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed
that the construction of the public-housing projects would decrease their
property values, increase cnme and population density, create

231. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia,J., concurring).
232. See id.; see al,so BREST ET AL., supra note 15, at 183 ("Perhaps Scalia's argument is that
disparate impact is constitutionally troublesome because it requires employers to consider the
racial effects of their actions. If so, why wouldn't this concern make unconstitutional any federal
policies that encourage voluntary compliance with workplace integration?").
233. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682.
234. See, e.g., GEORGE C. GALSTER ET AL., WHY NOT IN MY BACKYARD?: NEIGHBORHOOD
IMPACTS OF DECONCENTRATING AsSISTED HOUSING 50-73 (2003) (examining resistance to the
Section 8 and the Moving to Opportunity demonstration programs in Baltimore County);John
Goering, Expanding Housing Choice and Integrating Neighborhoods: The MTO Experiment, in THE
GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNI1Y: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 127,
136-37 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005); Edward G. Goetz et al., The Rise and Fall ofFair Share
Housing: Lessons from the Twin Cities, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNI1Y: RACE AND HOUSING
CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra, at 247, 260; Philip D. Tegeler, The Persistence of
Segregation in Government Housing Programs, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNI1Y: RACE AND
HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra, at 197. See generally SARA PRATT & MICHAEL
ALLEN, Hous. ALLIANCE OF PA., ADDRESSING COMMUNI1Y OPPOSITION TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT: A FAIR HOUSING TOOLKIT (2004) (providing housing developers with working
knowledge of fair housing).
2 35· 169 F.3d 973, 975--76, 978 (5th Cir. 1999).
236. Id. at 977-79.
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environmental problems, and diminish aesthetic values. 2 37 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed. The Fifth Circuit ruled
that such harms amounted to an "injury in fact" sufficient to support
standing to sue, applied strict scrutiny to the remedial order, and ultimately
ruled in the plaintiffs' favor. 2 3 8
Although there is a very good argument that the Fifth Circuit should
not have applied strict-scrutiny analysis in Walker in the first place, 2 39
perhaps Walker was a sign of things to come for the NOVP, because the
Court's construction of racial harm in Walker and Ricci is similar. In each
case, the government's integrative action takes something of value from a
reverse-discrimination plaintiff, either a valuable property interest or a
vested right to a promotion. It is possible that Walker (particularly after Riccz)
is predictive of how a court might evaluate the constitutionality of the
NOVP.
On the other hand, perhaps Walker and the NOVP are distinguishable.
First, Walker involved the siting of public housing projects rather than the
provision of Section 8 vouchers, which allow eligible recipients to secure
already existing housing in a particular community. Second, in Walker, the

237.
238.

Id.
Id. at 980. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:

[W]e cannot conclude, having reviewed the record, that the Homeowners did not
put forth adequate evidence at trial to confer standing upon them. The district
court did not hold that the Homeowners lack standing, as he was well aware of the
potential for neighborhood disruption traceable to improperly managed public
housing projects. HUD and DHA cite no cases in which standing has been denied
to homeowners who asserted their quality of life and property values would be
diminished by a next-door public housing or other HUD project.
Id.; id. at 981-82 (applying strict scrutiny and addressing the narrowly tailored prong).
239. See Philip Tegeler, The Future of Race-Conscious Goals in National Housing Policy, in
PUBLIC HOUSING AND THE LEGACY OF SEGREGATION 145, 152-55 (Margery Austin Turner et al.
eds., 2009). Tegeler explained:

[The] ruling in [Walker] is out of the legal mainstream because the policy that it
struck down did not involve individual race-based preferences, but rather a broad
geographically targeted consideration of race. But for the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the mere mention of race in an official policy was enough to trigger strict
scrutiny even though no individuals were targeted for differential treatment based
on race .... [Walker] is also an "outlier" for another reason: it makes no distinction
in the required constitutional analysis between court-ordered, race-conscious
programs and legislatively adopted programs like those at issue in Parents Involved.
A similar but more lenient standard would likely be applied to a court-ordered
remedy that had characteristics similar to the Seattle and Louisville admissions
preferences ....
Id. at 155; see also Walker v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 3:85-CV-1210-R, 1997 WL
33177466, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 1997), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 169 F.3d 973 (5th
Cir. 1999) (applying strict scrutiny when Homeowners asserted an order "violate[d] their rights
not to be discriminated against because of their race (white), and their right not to suffer a
supposed loss in property values because of that reverse discrimination").
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Fifth Circuit ruled that the remedial order requiring "newly constructed
units of public housing to be located in 'predominantly white' Dallas
neighborhoods," 24° amounted to an impermissible racial-classification
scheme. 241 In contrast, the NOVP is facially race-neutral and does not raise
the same concerns as an explicit racial classification. However, a problem
remains.
Even assuming that Walker can be distinguished on the theory that the
NOVP is facially race-neutral, Ricci implies that facially race-neutral actions
that are motivated by an integrative intent do not necessarily provide the
government with a safe harbor. The import of Ricci is not that it condemns
facially race-neutral governmental action outright but that it requires
governmental decisionmakers seeking to vindicate the ideals of the Equal
Protection Clause to second-guess what ought to be "no-brainer" decisions.
From this perspective, Ricci (like Parents Involved before it) shifts the defaults
and suggests that integration is no longer an appropriate public-policy
goal.242
Indeed, were the NOVP challenged, the federal government might be
in an even more compromised litigation posture than the City of New Haven
in Ricci. Unlike the City of New Haven in Rice~ were the federal government
to adopt the NOVP, it could not raise a "between a rock and a hard place"
defense. The federal government could not argue, as New Haven did in
Ricci, that it took integrative action in order to prevent "liability under Title
VII for adopting a practice that had a disparate impact on the minority
firefighters." 243 It is highly unlikely that the federal government would face
either statutory or constitutional liability for simply continuing to operate
the Housing Choice Voucher Program with the knowledge that participants
are likely to use their vouchers in "economically and racially segregated
neighborhoods." 244 In this respect, the federal government's litigation
position would be more consistent with that of the Louisville and Seattle
school districts in Parents Involved: Is there an appropriate justification for
the NOVP? Assuming strict-scrutiny review applies, the answer is yes.

240. 169 F.3d at 975.
241. Id. at 979 ("The remedial order's explicit racial classification alone is sufficient to
confer standing on these particular homeowners.").
242. James E. Ryan, Comment, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 131, 154-55 (2007).Ryanstates:
The [Parents Involved] plurality comes close to condemning voluntary integration
altogether, whereas Justice Kennedy accepts the goal but holds his nose at the
thought of how it might be achieved. Along the way, both the plurality and Justice
Kennedy chastise the local offitjals who crafted and implemented these plans for
their clumsiness and crudeness.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
243. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
244. POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, supra note 214, at 1.

2011]

IS INTEGRATION A DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE?

881

Grutter and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Parents Involved are

highly relevant to the compelling-governmental-interest analysis for NOVP
under strict scrutiny. Grutter, of course, emphasized the importance of
integration to American society beyond the educational context. 2 45
Specifically, Grutter upheld an explicit racial-classification scheme on the
theory that the benefits of integration outweighed the harm to the frustrated
white plaintiff, because the law school's selection process that used race as
one factor to determine admissions adequately protected her interests. 2 4 6
Justice Kennedy's approach in Parents Involved emphasized the importance
of eradicating de facto segregation and obtaining racial diversity in the
educational process. 2 47 From Justice Kennedy's perspective, facially raceneutral mechanisms intended to obtain racial diversity would not even
trigger strict-scrutiny review. 2 4 8 The purpose and structure of the NOVP are
consistent with both of .these approaches. Applying strict scrutiny to the
NOVP would satisfy the compelling-governmental-interest requirement.
Walker provides some guidance for the narrow-tailoring requirement. In
Walker, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the remedial order was not narrowly
tailored enough to remedy the vestiges of past discrimination and
segregation in Dallas's public-housing programs because a less restrictive
remedy was available: Section 8 housing vouchers. 2 49 Thus, the Fifth Circuit
viewed Section 8 as a permissible race-neutral alternative to the raceconscious requirement that public housing be located in predominantly
white _communities. 2 5° This approach is consistent with the United States'
approval of percentage plans as a facially race-neutral alternative to racebased affirmative action in the Grutter litigation. 2 5 1 Of course, the Fifth
Circuit did not consider the government's role in "steering" recipients to
predominantly white neighborhoods, a core component of the NOVP.
Instead, it simply opined that "Section 8 is superior to a race-conscious
remedy in that it allows market forces and personal preferences rather than
racial criteria to guide the homemaking decision." 2 5 2 The NOVP, however,
seems consistent with Justice Kennedy's approval of facially race-neutral, yet
race-conscious, mechanisms for enhancing diversity and eradicating de facto
segregation in Parents lnvolved. 2 53 Moreover, to the extent that the NOVP
operates prospectively and uses private housing already existing in a

245.
246.
24 7.
248.
249.
250.
251.
14-18.
252.
253.

See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part 111.B.
169 F.3d 973, 984-85 (5th Cir. 1999).
See supra Part 11.B.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 184, at
Walker, 169 F.3d at 984.
See supra Part 111.B.
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particular neighborhood, it does not appear to disestablish any vested right
and create the "racial harm" at issue in Ricci.

VI. CONCLUSION
Today, "minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels," 2 54
and vote at unprecedented rates. 2 55 African-Americans and other minority
group members occupy positions of power and influence in law, business,
the military, government, education and a variety of other areas, 2 56 and
many of the racial barriers that defined America during the time of ''.Jim

254. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2511 (2009); see also
Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights Act: How Much
Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 385 n.3 (2008)
(citing statistics of increased African-American and Hispanic elected officials).
255. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL TIME SERIES TABLES, REPORTED VOTING AND
REGISTRATION BY RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN, SEX, AND AGE GROUPS: NOVEMBER 1964 TO 2008 tbl.A1 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/
historical/index.html (reporting African-American voter turnout for the 2008 presidential
election at 64.7% of the citizen population, the highest percent reported dating back to the
1964 Current Population Survey); see also David A. Bositis, Blacks and the 2008 Elections: A
Preliminary Anarysis, Focus MAG., Dec. 2008, at 1, 13-16 & tbls.1-3 ("Black turnout in the 2008
election ... was at an historic high.").
256. Based on the 2000 U.S. Census, the total minority representation among lawyers is
about 9.7%, 20.8% among accountants and auditors, 24.6% among physicians and surgeons,
and 18.2% among college and university teachers. ELIZABETH CHAMBLISS, AM. BAR Ass'N,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, MILES TO Go: PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1 l
(2005); see also Don]. DeBenedictis, Changi,ng Faces, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1991, at 54, 54 (1991) ("The
number of minority lawyers has grown in recent years, albeit slowly."). Prominent examples of
minority national and state politicians abound: Barack Obama, President of the United States;
Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General; Colin Powell, former National Security Advisor, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State; Sonia Sotomayor, Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court; Roderick Paige, former Secretary of Education; John Conyers, U.S. Representative,
Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary; Henry Cisneros, former Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development; Condoleezza Rice, former Secretary of State; Bill
Richardson, Governor of New Mexico; David Paterson, former Governor of New York. In
business, in 2006, minorities held 188 (15.42%) of the 1219 seats on the boards of the Fortune
100 companies. THE ALLIANCE FOR BD. DIVERSI1Y, WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 100
BOARDS 6 (2008), http://theabd.org/Women and Minorities on F100 Boards_2008.pdf. And
African-Americans are achieving representation in the important social and political circles of
our nation's capital. Roxanne Roberts & Krissah Thompson, Washington's High-Level Social Scene
Now Mingles Black and White, WASH. POST,Jan. 18, 2009, at Ai. Finally, courts have recognized
this growing minority clout. Barnett v. City of Chi., 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1449 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
("African-Americans and Latinos hold important and influential positions of power within the
City's government, as chairmen or vice-chairmen of City Council committees, and within Cook
County government. Latinos and African-Americans also serve in several highly influential
appointed offices in Chicago. In positions such as these minority leaders enjoy input in guiding
the course of public policy."), affd in part and vacated in part, 141 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998);
Reed v. Town of Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843, 890 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("African-Americans have
important and influential positions of power within the municipal government, in the
Democratic party and on local boards. The number of seats that African-Americans hold on
local boards is in proportion to their population in the Town.").
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Crow" have fallen. 2 57 Yet the legacy of that era remains. This Article asks, is
integration a form of discrimination? Until very recently, the answer to this
question almost certainly would have been "no." But the Supreme Court is
currently in the midst of a significant conversation about the meaning of
"discrimination" in a world in which, in one view, many of the goals of the
Civil Rights Movement have been achieved. 2 5 8 For this reason, the
conversation is complicated, and the stakes are high.
Parents Involved and Ricci reveal a Court poised to adopt the
"equivalence doctrine," that there is a "'moral [and] constitutional
equivalence,' between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that
distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current
notion of equality." 2 59 Ricci's innovation is to extend the Court's skepticism
of government action intended to "foster some current notion of equality"
beyond explicit racial classifications into the realm of race-dependent, yet
facially race-neutral, determinations. But the Court has not yet fully adopted
the equivalence doctrine. In this regard, Justice Kennedy's .concurring
opinion in Parents Involved is key. In that opinion, Justice Kennedy leaves
open the possibility for the government to take affirmative steps to
ameliorate de facto segregation and obtain racial diversity. 260 Such a
possibility could only exist if there is a "legal and practical difference
between the use of race-conscious criteria ... to keep the races apart, and
the use of race conscious criteria ... to bring the races together." 261
I have demonstrated that effective facially race-neutral programs that do
not entrench the status quo, open up access to opportunity, and provide for

257. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 149-88 (commemorative
ed. 2002); see also JERROLD M. PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: THE HISTORY OF JIM CROW 21073 (2002) (tracing the history after World War II when the United States began to show a move
toward racial justice, including the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965).
258. See, e.g., Parents _Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,551 U.S. 701 (2007);
Quintard Taylor, The Civil Rights Movement in the American West: Black Protest in Seattle, r960r970, So J. NEGRO HIST. 1, 1 (1995) (identifying three historical views on the Civil Rights
Movement: One, as an era "dominated by a powerful and ultimately successful national political
coalition led by heroic figures such as Martin Luther King, Jr. that secured new laws insuring
equality and opportunity." Another "locate[s] both the origins and success of the Civil Rights
Movement in local initiatives from grass-roots organizations in the South." And the third: "The
[Civil Rights] Movement should be viewed as a national transformation, an energizing of small
and large African American communities throughout the country, inspired by national goals
and leadership, but which pursued distinctly local agendas .... [For some, the Movement] was
... the campaign to end job bias or school segregation in their local communities as an integral
part of the national effort to eradicate racism, empower African Americans, and achieve the full
and final democratization of the United States."), cited in Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 873 app.
B (Breyer,]., dissenting).
259. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,240 (1995) (Thomas,]., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
260. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
261. Id. at 829 (Breyer,]., dissenting).
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maximum racial integration, such as the National Opportunity Voucher
Program, should comfortably survive constitutional review. But the next
logical step in this progression looms on the horizon: the question of the
constitutionality of Title Vll's disparate-impact provisions. If the Court fully
embraces the proposition that the government's racial motivations are truly
symmetrical, then disparate impact, with its requirement that employers
"evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and ... make decisions based
on (because of) those racial outcomes," 262 is at grave risk. The Court has not
yet fully embraced the equivalence doctrine, but the constitutional
conversation in this area is far from finished.

262.

Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia,]., concurring).

